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INTRODUCTION
This Article presents a new theory of lawyers' obligations to pro-
vide free representation to the poor. In putting forward our views, we
hope to break, or at least loosen, the current logjam in the debate
over mandatory pro bono programs. Much of the discussion has
been hampered by a lack of common ground. Pro bono advocates
argue from need, responsibility, even morality, while opponents em-
phasize equally compelling principles of autonomy and freedom.
Framed often as a contest between polar positions, there is little per-
ceived room for compromise. If pro bono representation is a bed-
rock professional duty, then lawyers simply have to do it. Period. On
the other hand, if it is an unwarranted encroachment on personal
freedom, then mandatory programs must be staunchly resisted. Pe-
riod.
We believe, however, that there is a way to shift the discourse away
from absolutes and into more fruitful territory. As we will develop in
the course of this Article, our "public assets" theory posits that lawyers
are, at least in part, concessionaires. Attorneys are granted exclusive
access to certain publicly created commodities which they subse-
quently provide (at a price) to clients. Thus, a portion of lawyers' in-
come is directly attributable to their ability to market "lawyer-
commodities" that have been provided to them, at no charge, by the
public. The exaction of a pro bono obligation can therefore be seen
as a simple recapture of some of the profit derived from access to this
asset.
In this Article we set out four publicly created lawyer-assets, each
of which provides rights of privacy and information control. We
submit that clients pay their lawyers for access to secrecy, which comes
in the form of ethics-based duties such as confidentiality and conflicts
protection, as well as the evidence-based protections of the attorney-
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client privilege and the work product doctrine. If we are correct that
secrecy is a commodity, of which lawyers are the vendors but not the
creators, then the conversation may shift to consideration of the con-
sequences of lawyers' use of that commodity. In other words, pro
bono duty becomes the equivalent of a user fee-neither a moral im-
perative nor an assault on individual rights and freedoms, but rather
a familiar and legitimate consequence of economic relationships.
We advance this position as a first step, recognizing that much will
remain to be debated even if our arguments are as persuasive as we
hope them to be. How extensively do lawyers exploit privacy-
commodities? In what ways should lawyers be treated differently from
other professionals and merchants who also utilize public assets?
What would constitute fair recapture of the benefits lawyers realize
from their ability to "sell" secrecy?
A. Mandatory Pro Bono Obligations
For over a century, leaders of the legal profession have stressed
the need for lawyers to contribute their time and energy to the needs
of the underserved and disadvantaged. Increasingly, proposals have
come in the form of mandatory pro bono plans, which would require
every lawyer to devote a specified number of hours annually to repre-
senting poor or middle-income clients. While luminaries ranging
from a president of the American Bar Association1 to a Justice of the
United States Supreme Court have exerted their moral authority in
support of one plan or another, to date no state has adopted a com-
prehensive pro bono requirement.
The principled opposition to mandatory pro bono plans is based
See Talbot D'Alemberte, Calling the Roll of Lauyers. Providing Service to A1, 21 CAP.
U. L. REV. 861, 863 (1992) ("[The real problem for American lawyers today... is to
solve the problem of equal access tojustice.").
2 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Meeting the Demand for Pro Bono Services, 2 B.U. PUB.
INT. LJ. 1, 1 (1992) (suggesting that lawyers should be "ashamed... of how we are
responding to the needs of people who can't afford to pay for our services").
A number of states, including Florida, Texas, Hawaii and New York, have taken
steps to motivate lawyers to render more pro bono services, but none have gone so far
as to enact an actual requirement. See Ruth Singleton, BarLeaders Urge Mandatory Serv-
ice, Reporting of Hours, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at A23.
Florida, for example, adopted a rule in 1993 requiring lawyers to report annually
the number of hours spent on pro bono practice. Although a federal court recently
upheld the constitutionality of the requirement, the rule itself was suspended by the
Florida Supreme Court almost immediately after its adoption. See id
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upon considerations of fairness, efficiency and freedom of choice.
These are important objections. Indeed, we recognize that the stan-
dard pro-pro bono arguments have been inadequate to the task of re-
futing the major intellectual criticisms.5
The typical argument in favor of mandatory pro bono obligations
begins with a statement of need: the poor and middle classes are
dramatically underserved by lawyers. Next comes a statement of duty
based, variously, on moral obligation, necessity or the so-called
"monopoly theory." While the need for broader legal services is rela-
tively easy to demonstrate, it has not been rigorously established that
individual lawyers should bear the burden of meeting that need. Ob-
ligations premised on moral duty or necessity ultimately fail analyti-
cally because it cannot be shown persuasively that only lawyers should
bear the social responsibility of fulfilling unmet legal needs. The
monopoly theory seeks to provide just that linchpin, but it fails em-
pirically. With nearly one million American lawyers in sharp competi-
tion with one another,6 it is difficult to show that there is a monopoly
in any conventional sense.
We believe that lawyers should be required to devote a portion of
their professional time to pro bono representation. Despite the
weaknesses of prior pro bono arguments, we are optimistic that our
"public commodities" theory will prove both intellectually and em-
pirically rigorous in establishing the analytical basis for that duty.
B. The Public Assets Theory
In brief, the public assets theory is based upon the concept that
every lawyer profits from the sale to clients of certain publicly created
assets. A mandatory pro bono plan, therefore, should be regarded as
4 See In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Servs., 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983)
(rejecting adoption of mandatory pro bono program and noting that "a person's vol-
untary service... has to come from within the soul of that person"); Debra Burke et
al., Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications, 26 LOy. U. CHI. LJ. 61, 83 (1994) (arguing
that greater efficiency is achieved by donating money, as opposed to services); Timo-
thy P. Terrell &James H. Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism, "41 EMORY LJ. 403, 430
(1992) (noting that considerations of professionalism require that the bar facilitate
pro bono efforts, but not mandate individual obligations).
Attorneys may also resist pro bono plans on the basis of self-interest. They do
not want to be told what to do, and they do not want to divert effort and attention
away from their paying clients. We recognize that no amount or quality of argument
will win over lawyers who object to pro bono plans on purely monetary grounds.
6As ofJune 1996, there were 946,499 lawyers in the United States. American Bar
Association, Membership Ranking by State (June 1996).
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comparable to an in-kind user fee, severance or commission, returned
to the public in exchange for the right to exploit a public resource.
What do lawyers sell? For the most part, counsel's services consist
of the attorney's own accumulated human capital: knowledge, skill,
education, experience, reputation, discretion and good judgment.
7
Consider these and similar services to be a bundle of commodities,
sold to the client as a package, each supplying a benefit to the client,
and each justifying a portion of the lawyer's fee.
In addition to the lawyer's self-generated assets, attorneys also sell
certain publicly created assets. Chief among these are certain rights
of confidentiality and enforceable duties of loyalty.8 Unlike the law-
yer's human capital, these assets were created by the public, either
through statutes, judicial codes of conduct, or the operation of com-
mon law. While it is generally understood that these resources were
conceived primarily to confer benefits upon clients, it is certain that
they also enhance the value of lawyers' services, and that they there-
fore increase lawyers' fees.9 In other words, all lawyers constantly en-
gage in the sale of publicly created resources. Because the lawyers
themselves did nothing to create the assets, but are nonetheless able
to sell them at a profit, economists would refer to this as the extrac-
tion of rents or quasi-rents.'0 Our argument for a mandatory pro
bono obligation is that the public, having created the assets and as-
signed them to lawyers, is entitled to recapture some portion of the
rent in the form of in-kind services.
Part I surveys the principal arguments that have been put forth in
favor of mandatory pro bono plans, critiquing them and demonstrat-
ing their analytic flaws and persuasive failings. Part II describes and
develops our own "public assets" theory, which we think is free from
many of the shortcomings of the other approaches. Part III provides
examples of other "in-kind" duties imposed in consequence of the
See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 109-62 (1993) (discussing the attributes that make for a successful attor-
ney). Regarding lawyers' investment in "reputation capital," seeJonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1108 (1995) ("Lawyers make investments in reputation capital by
attending prestigious law schools and byjoining prestigious law firms.").
8 See Macey & Miller, supra note 7, at 1108 (noting that ethical assurances make
clients more willing to hire lawyers).
9 See id. at 1105 (arguing that rules governing client confidentiality and conflicts of
interest further the economic interests of the legal profession).
10 See Charles Hulter & Frank Wykoff, Issues in the Measurement of Economic Deprecia-
tion: Introductory Remarks, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 10 (1996).
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use of public assets. Part IV addresses the previous arguments against
mandatory pro bono plans, explaining that they are insufficient to
overcome the "public assets" theory. Finally, Part V deals briefly with
the "tax or draft" question: Must pro bono obligations be met by pro-
viding personal services, or should there be a "buy out" provision?
I. THE CALL FOR PRO BoNo PROGRAMS
The ideal of law practice as public service is as old as the profes-
sion itself. For many, altruism has always been the defining feature of
true professionalism." Nonetheless, the early development of profes-
sional standards did not include required pro bono services. The
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics make no mention of a general duty
to provide free services.12 The 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility
addresses the issue, but only through exhortation: "Every lawyer, re-
gardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should
find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged."
1 3
In 1977, the American Bar Association established a special
Commission on Professional Standards, assigned to draft a new set of
ethics rules. Chaired by the late Robert Kutak, the Commission even-
tually produced the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have
since been adopted in whole or part by over forty United States juris-
dictions. 4 In an early draft, the Kutak Commission proposed that
1 See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, "...IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR REKINDLING LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 15 (1986)
[hereinafter IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE] (suggesting that members of the bar
should increase participation in pro bono activities); Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or
One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 144, 146-47
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES] (discussing altruism as an aspect of professionalism).
12 See CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). The closest provision is found in
Canon 4, titled "When Counsel for An Indigent Prisoner": "A lawyer assigned as coun-
sel for an indigent prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and
should always exert his best efforts in his behalf."
13MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1969). The drafters of
the Model Code considered the "Ethical Considerations" to be "aspirational in character
and [to] represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive." Id. at 1. Only the "Disciplinary Rules" were meant to be enforceable and
"mandatory in character." Id. None of the Disciplinary Rules mention pro bono obli-
gations.
14 ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 01:3-4 (1984 & Supp.
1995). For a social and political history of the Kutak Commission debates, see Theo-
dore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 11, at 95.
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every lawyer, as a condition of membership in the bar, be required to
provide forty hours of pro bono services each year (or the financial
equivalent).' Prompted by heavy opposition from members of the
bar, this rule was watered down through successive stages of the proc-
ess until the ABA's House of Delegates finally adopted a purely volun-
tary rule: "A lawyer should render public interest legal service." 6 The
pro bono provision is the only rule in the entire Model Rules that is not
mandatory.1
7
Notwithstanding the compromise nature of the eventual Model
Rule, 8 the leadership of the American Bar Association continued to
identify a need for lawyers to provide pro bono services. Three years
following the adoption of the Model Rules, the ABA's Commission on
Professionalism ("Stanley Commission") issued a report stressing the
importance of lawyers' participation in pro bono activities. '9 In 1991,
the House of Delegates reaffirmed the ABA's goal of promoting
"meaningful access to legal representation... for all persons regard-
less of their economic or social condition."" In 1992, ABA President
Talbot D'Alemberte stated that among his top priorities was to




In 1993, the American Bar Association formally revisited the ques-
tion of pro bono obligations when the Standing Committee on Law-
yers' Public Service Responsibility submitted to the House of Dele-
gates a proposed amendment to Model Rule 6.1. The report
accompanying the proposal emphasized the "current crisis in the de-
livery of legal services to the poor."2 The Committee reasoned that,
while members of the bar alone cannot be expected to solve this serv-
Is SeeSchneyer, supra note 14 at 113-14.
16 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) (emphasis added).
17 The comment makes it clear that there was to be no actual requirement of pro
bono services. "This Rule... is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary
process." Id. at Rule 6.1 cmt.
18 SeeJoseph L. Torres & Mildred R Stansky, In Support of a Mandatoy Public Service
Obligation, 29 EMORYL.J. 997, 999-1001 (1980) (discussing the disagreement in the le-
gal community over various Model Rule drafts addressing pro bono practices).
19 SeeIN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 11, at 47.
20 Robert MacCrate, "The Lost Lauyer" Regained: The Abiding Values of the Legal Profes-
sion, 100 DICK. L. REV. 587, 610 (1996).
21 Talbot D'Alemberte, Lauyers Have a Duty to Serve the Poor, JUDGES' J., Summer
1992, at 18, 19.
22 ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyers' Public Service Responsibility, Report to the
House of Delegates, at 6 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter Report to House of Delegates] (on file
with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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ice crisis, lawyers should be called upon to increase their pro bono ac-
tivities to help meet the needs of the disadvantaged2s Although the
House of Delegates did not adopt the Committee's report, it did en-
act the amendment to Model Rule 6.1, clarifying the expectation of
lawyers' services, while maintaining the precatory nature of the rule:
"[a] lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono
publico legal services per year.
2"
Thus, for at least the last twenty years the organized bar has been
simultaneously pressing lawyers to expand their pro bono efforts,
while steadfastly avoiding any actual requirement that they do so.
The cause of public service has great institutional support, both at the
national and state levels.2s We believe, along with many others, that a
certain level of pro bono involvement should be a requisite of bar
membership.26 It is clear, however, that the arguments in favor of
mandatory pro bono plans have thus far been unpersuasive-no ju-
risdiction, and no bar association, have adopted such a plan.
In our view, one reason for this failure to act has been the inade-
quacy of the standard arguments in favor of mandatory pro bono re-
quirements. While the pro-pro bono rationales have been morally
appealing, they have lacked the quality of intellectual infrastructure
that would allow them to overcome principled opposition.
We now turn to a critique of the traditional pro bono arguments.
0 See id.
24 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1993). The new Rule 6.1
additionally states that lawyers should provide "a substantial majority of the (50) hours
of legal services without fee or expectation of fee." It also defines the classes of per-
sons and organizations that might be the recipient of pro bono services, and con-
cludes by stating that "a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support for or-
ganizations that provide legal services to persons of limited means." Id.
See, e.g., Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final Paper to
the Chief Judge of New York 19 HOFsTRA L. REV. 755, 756 (1991) [hereinafter Marrero
Committee Report] (recommending "a comprehensive program of remedial actions" to
address the "unmet need for civil legal services among the poor in New York state").
26According to a 1994 survey, American lawyers bill an average of 2500 hours per
year. See Thom Weidlich, In World Legal Bills, U.S. Wins on Hours, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 17,
1994, at AS. Amended Rule 6.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct recom-
mends at least 50 hours per year of pro bono work, which is therefore roughly two
percent of most lawyers' workload. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
6.1 (1993). NewYork's Marrero Commission recommended 20 hours per year, or less
than one percent of the typical lawyer's output. See Marrero Committee Report, supra note
25, at 756 (proposing a requirement that lawyers devote a minimum of 40 hours every
two years to pro bono representation). We take no position on which measure is pref-
erable, though we think that the Marrero Report and the Model Rule probably lie at
the ends of the appropriate continuum.
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A. Crisis In Legal Services
Most arguments in favor of pro bono plans proceed from the
premise that there is a "legal crisis" in the United States. And indeed,
there can be little doubt that the legal needs of the poor and middle
classes have been drastically underserved. By one estimate, eighty
percent of the legal needs of the poor go unmet,27 and a significant
percentage of middle class families are also unable to afford basic le-
gal services.2' Attempts to deal with this problem through voluntary
plans have been essentially unsuccessful. 9
At the same time, it appears that governmental support for legal
services is on a steady downward trend. In 1993, when Model Rule
6.1 was amended, federal support for the Legal Services Corporation
stood at $328 million.0 By 1996, the budget for the Legal Services
Corporation had decreased to $278 million,'1 a cut of over fifteen
percent, with further reductions looming on the horizon.,2
Whether one accepts or rejects the "crisis" designation,"3 it seems
27 See Report to House of Delegates, supra note 22, at 6, and reports cited therein.
28 See Torres & Stansky, supra note 18, at 1023-24 n.113 (discussing an ABA com-
mittee report which found that "'lawyers are consulted for slightly less than a third of
the problems encountered that reasonably could be called legal problems'" (quoting
B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBIC 261 (1977))).
Despite the admonition of Model Rule 6.1, there is no indication that lawyers
have substantially increased their pro bono hours. Recent debates in Congress over
funding for legal services programs reveal that poor and middle class families are still
unable to obtain representation. See 141 CONG. REc. S14,612 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that legal needs studies from various states show
that only 15-20% of civil legal needs of the poor are being met by current funding lev-
els). No state has yet adopted a mandatory pro bono plan, although several have insti-
tuted voluntary plans. As admirable as they may be, there is no indication that any of
these voluntary plans have made significant inroads into satisfying the unmet needs of
the disadvantaged. See Marrero Committee Repo4 supra note 25, at 824 (noting that de-
spite the fact that bar associations nationwide have made concerted efforts to encour-
age voluntary services, only about 10% of all attorneys in New York engage in pro
bono work geared toward the poor); Michael Millemann, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil
Cases: A Partial Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18, 58 (1990) (noting that
voluntary programs in Maryland have not met the need for legal services of the poor).
30 Report to House of Delegates, supra note 22, at 7 (citing Lillian Johnson, Project Ad-
visory Group, Testimony Before the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indi-
gent Defendants on Funding for the Legal Services Corporation for FY 1993 (Nov. 2,
1991) and Attachment).
3, See Payment to the Legal Services Corporation, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321-50 (1996).
32 See Claudia MacLachlan, LSC Fights for Its Life; Funding May Be Cut 50%, NAT'L
LJ.,suly 29, 1996, atA14.
Certainly some of the indicators that might commonly be used to connote a cri-
sis-threats to health, life, safety, property or general welfare-are implicated by the
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amply clear that neither private efforts nor public funding will be
adequate at any time in the foreseeable future to provide essential le-
gal services for Americans of limited means. It has often been sug-
gested that lawyers, individually or as a profession, have a special duty
to attempt to ameliorate this problem.s' The argument from need, in
all of its variations, inevitably stands or falls on the establishment of
such a special duty.
1. Lawyers' Role
A frequent argument in favor of mandatory pro bono plans is that
lawyers stand in a unique position to alleviate the crisis. Because law-
yers are indispensable to the legal process, proponents of this view
reason that lawyers have an obligation to make sure the process
works.35 Since the process is based on the idea of adequate individual
representation, the conclusion is that lawyers must make such repre-
sentation available, even if that means serving for no fee.5
The gap in the argument lies in the transition from need to duty.
True, there is a need. And true, only lawyers can provide the neces-
sary professional skills to meet the need. But why must their service
be compelled, and at no fee? With the flight of jobs to distant sub-
urbs, coupled with the decline of mass transit, many of the urban
inability of so many people to obtain legal services. On the other hand, the "crisis"
characterization has also been rejected as overstated or unjustified. See Marrero Com-
mittee Report, supra note 25, at 848 (statement of committee member Sol Neil Corbin,
dissenting from the committee's recommendation and denying the existence of cri-
sis); Jonathan R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich ?,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1116 (1992) (arguing that poor persons rationally choose
not to expend limited resources on hiring lawyers).
See, e.g., Report to House ofDelegates, supra note 22, at 6 (discussing lawyers' duty to
address legal crises).
See, e.g., Terrell & Wildman, supra note 4, at 422-23 (noting that the special posi-
tion of law in American society dictates special obligations for the legal profession);
Torres & Stansky, supra note 18, at 1026 ("[F]or better or worse, justice under the law,
as society has come to regard and require, cannot be done without lawyers.").
36Even when arguing that the government bears part of the burden to provide
access to the judicial system, it is posited that lawyers bear an independent responsibil-
ity. SeeMillemann, supra note 29, at 12-13 ("[A]ttorneys must take the lead in helping
to serve the legal needs of the poor as a prerequisite to seeking additional government
support."); see also Stephen T. Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the Supreme Court of lorida
to Promote the Full Availability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973, 975 (1987)
(noting that although mandatory pro bono seems extreme, many have concluded that
it is the only effective way to meet the legal needs of the poor); Torres & Stansky, supra
note 18, at 1025 ("Not only are lawyers better prepared ... to deal with the pervasive-
ness and complexity that is the law.., but they are an element indispensable to the
legal process." (footnote omitted)).
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poor are certainly facing a transportation crisis. Nonetheless, the
"special role" of taxi and limousine drivers (all licensed professionals)
is not thought to compel a mandatory shuttle service. The crisis in
medical services for the poor is addressed through tax-supported
programs such as Medicaid and the public health service. While only
medical professionals can supply the necessary care, their "special
role" is not thought to require them to work for free. Thus, "need"
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the establishment of
mandatory pro bono duties. 8 Consequently, an argument strictly
from necessity must fail: lawyers do not have to solve the problem
simply because they can.
Over the years, pro bono proponents have attempted, with little
success, to supply the necessary link between need and duty, typically
by expanding or expounding on the unique position of lawyers in
American society. ChiefJudge Harry T. Edwvards of the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit advances one of the most cogent arguments."0 Judge
Edivards points out that because of the highly legalized nature of our
society, lawyers are "essential to virtually all projects of social im-
port."40  This gives lawyers "disproportionate social and political
power," which can only be legitimated by assuming an affirmative
duty to "cultivate professional public spiritedness."4' Judge Edwards
therefore believes that lawyers have a social and moral duty to repre-
sent those people who do not have sufficient access to legal services.42
Judge Edwards's position provides a compelling rationale for
those who accept "public spiritedness" as an essential attribute of pro-
fessionalism. For others, however, there is no evident relationship be-
37 Indeed, physicians in private practice are not even required to accept Medicare
and Medicaid patients, should they deem the level of reimbursement too low. Cf.
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. Assoc., Caringfor the Poor,
269JAMA 2533, 2535 (1993) ("While the majority of physicians do provide free or re-
duced fee practices, as high as one-quarter to one-third of practitioners may fail to
provide services to the poor.").
38 But cf Maher, supra note 36, at 975 (arguing that mandatory pro bono is not un-
reasonable in light of the massive legal needs of the poor).
39 Harry T. Edwards, A Lauyers Duty to Serve the Public Good, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1148
(1990).
40 Id. at 1156.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 1150, 1160; see also Steven Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and
Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDozo L. REV. 255, 281 (1981) (stating that although
courts and legislatures have created a host of procedural rights and substantive reme-
dies for the poor, "those advances become empty promises without lawyers to vindi-
cate the rights and pursue the remedies").
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tween social and political power and an obligation to serve the poor.
Why must individual lawyers, at their own expense, fulfill the empty
promises made by courts and legislatures? Judge Edwards's argument
is ultimately moral in nature-convincing to the already converted,
but lacking sufficient basis on which to compel the unconvinced.4
A similar theme is found in the report of New York's Committee
to Improve the Availability of Legal Services (the "Marrero Commit-
tee"), which is one of the most thorough treatments to date of the
mandatory pro bono issue. In 1988, the ChiefJudge of the New York
Court of Appeals appointed a committee to study the legal needs of
the poor and to create a plan to address those needs. Chaired by
Victor Marrero, the committee presented a report calling for a state-
wide requirement that all practicing attorneys in New York provide at
least forty hours of pro bono service every two years.45
The Marrero Committee proposal generated substantial contro-
versy and opposition, including two dissenting statements from mem-
46bers of the committee. In his letter accompanying the committee
report, Chairman Marrero responded to the opposition by explaining
the bases for the committee's conclusions. First, Marrero underlined
the committee's belief that the most effective way to address the
shortage of legal services was through the imposition of a pro bono
requirement.47 Second, he stated that the committee was "saiisfied
that there is adequate historical, ethical, and legal basis" for its con-
clusion that lawyers' "special role" creates a pro bono duty to the legal
system.
48
Again we see the conflation of need and duty. This leads to the
failure to come to grips with the argument that it is not the obligation
of individual lawyers to solve social problems. While it is no doubt ef-
43 See, e.g., Greg Stevens, Note, Forcing Attorneys to Represent Indigent Civil Litigants:
The Problems and Some Prposals, 18 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 767 (1985) (arguing that the
responsibility to provide legal services to the poor should not be placed on members
of the bar).
See Sol Wachtler, Symposium on Mandatory Pro Bono: Introduction, 19 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 739 (1991).
45 See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 25, at 770, 793.
See id. at 847 (statement of Sol Neil Corbin). Corbin found the evidence insuffi-
cient to demonstrate that a legal crisis actually existed in New York, therefore conclud-
ing that it was inappropriate to compel lawyers to render free services. See id; see also id.
at 850 (statement of Robert B. Fiske, Jr.) (arguing that more attention should be fo-
cused on increasing voluntary pro bono before further consideration of mandatory
requirements).
47 Id. at 757.
48 Id. at 757, 770.
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ficient to place that burden on attorneys, the majority of practitioners
resist the notion that it is their responsibility to step in where the gov-
ernment has failed to act.4 9 As to the Marrero Committee's reliance
on an "historical, ethical, and legal basis" for its recommendation,
one need look no further than the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, cited as authority by the committee report,5 to realize the circular-
ity of its argument. The drafters of the Model Code took pains to
avoid providing an ethical or historical-much less legal-basis for
mandatory pro bono programs."'
Thus, the Marrero Committee Report argues persuasively that
New York should have a lawyers' pro bono program, but does not
demonstrate why the program should be compulsory. In other words,
the committee supposes a duty but does not establish one.
2. Officers of the Court
A further elaboration on the need/duty argument rests on law-
yers' status as so-called "officers of the court,"52 as evidenced by the
fact that attorneys are sometimes obligated to accept court appoint-
ments in criminal cases.5 3 Unlike the necessity theory, the "officer of
the court" theory is not based upon a posited obligation to serve the
poor or to protect the constitutional rights of the accused. It is de-
rived instead from a duty to assist the court in the administration of
justice. Thus, court-appointed lawyers must serve not because they
are needed by defendants, but rather because their defined role in
the legal system requires that they come to the aid of judges when
necessary.5 It is therefore unsurprising that most "officer of the
49 This proposition may be shown empirically. It is estimated that only about 10%
of lawyers voluntarily engage in pro bono work. See supra note 29. It is obvious that,
among the other 90%, there has been no groundswell of support for mandatory pro-
grams.
. See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 25, at 757.
51 See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
32 Marrero Committee Report, supra note 25, at 780.
5s For the origin and history of the obligation to accept court-appointed criminal
cases, see United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978
(1966). Dillon is the most frequently cited case for the proposition that lawyers, be-
cause they are officers of the court, must serve without fee in court appointed cases.
See id. at 635; Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965)
(affirming a lower court's dismissal of an attorney's claim for compensation for serv-
ices rendered in representing an indigent client); Weiner v. Fulton County, 148 S.E.2d
143, 147 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966) (holding that serving as court
appointed counsel is a duty of office). But see DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740
P.2d 437, 441 (Alaska 1987) (holding that the traditional/historical position of lawyer
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court" appointments arise in the context of criminal law, where the
court's own duty may require the assignment of defense counsel.
The tenuous nature of the bar's obligation, however, is apparent
from the fact that it has been so seldom invoked. Judges themselves
do not really believe that all lawyers are their "officers," subject to
compelled services without compensation. To be sure, American law-
yers have a long custom of acknowledging court appointments, 55
56sometimes accepting them at significant personal sacrifice. Timothy
Terrell and James Wildman have demonstrated, however, that law-
yers' assistance to the courts stems from a tradition of commitment to
professionalism, rather than from historical obligation.5 7 It is, as Rob-
ert Gordon puts it, part of the "ceremonial rhetoric" of the bar.58
Consequently, many courts have rejected the "officer of the court"
concept. 9 For example, in State ex rel. Scott v. Roper,60 the Missouri Su-
preme Court held that judges do not have the power to compel attor-
neys to represent civil litigants without compensation. The Roper
court noted that the "officer of the court" designation for lawyers
originated in English common law at a time when lawyers were
granted special privileges, such as exemption from arrest and military
duty, and certain immunities from suit.6' Since those privileges never
obtained in the United States (and have long since atrophied even in
England), the court observed that "officer of the court" is at best an
empty title, "used as an incantation with little or no analysis of what
the title means or why a particular result should flow from it."62 The
as officer of the court cannotjustify an otherwise unconstitutional taking of legal serv-
ices without compensation).
5 See, e.g., CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 4 (1947) ("A
lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not ask to be excused for
any trivial reason, and should always exert his best efforts in his behalf.").
The most famous, though fictional, example is found in Harper Lee's To KILL A
MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
7 See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 4, at 432 (arguing that professionalism relates
to "a core sense of self-respect among lawyers" and that such professionalism does ex-
ist within the bar).
Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1988).
59 See, e.g., DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 441-42 (Alaska 1987);
State ex reL Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 759-69 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). But see
Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (D. Neb. 1995) (magistrate
judge) (finding that "[tihe critics' challenges to the validity of the office-of-the-court
doctrine, while forceful, are flawed").
60 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en banc).
61 See id. at 765.
62
Id. at 767 (citing RobertJ. Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer of the Court: Time to
Take the Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C. L. REV. 541 (1984)).
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Roper court concluded, as do we, that no current obligation should be
premised upon "this anachronism from English legal history." s
B. Monopoly Theory
A second standard pro-pro bono argument rests on the premise
that attorneys are granted an exclusive right to "operate the adversar-
ial system that implements the law." As a consequence of this "state-
licensed monopoly of lawyers over legal work,"" it is posited that law-
yers may be required to provide free representation as a condition of
licensure.65 Barriers to entry, though not as formidable as in the past,
continue to operate in favor of lawyers by limiting the supply6 of legal
services. Additionally, the organized bar perseveres in its efforts to
prevent nonlawyers from engaging in activities that might be consid-
ered the practice of law."
The standard monopoly argument is intellectually coherent, but
factually weak. Licensure and monopoly are not entirely congruent
concepts. Most states license barbers and beauticians, but those pro-
fessions remain open to nearly all comers and consequently there is
no shortage of competition among hair-cutters. On the other hand,
many cities sharply limit the availability of taxicab medallions, result-
6 Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Introduction to LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTCES supra note 11, at 1, 7.
63 See Edwards, supra note 39, at 1159 (arguing that "the standard of public spirit-
edness requires every lawyer to remain committed, in word and deed, to preserve full
and equal access to justice for all members of society"); Tigran W. Eldred & Thomas
Schoenherr, The Lauyer's Duty of Public Service: More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV.
367, 399 (1993-1994) (stating that "every lawyer, as a condition of membership, has a
professional responsibility to help assure that legal services are available to those in
need"); Wachtler, supra note 44, at 740 (discussing a mandatory pro bono require-
ment for all admitted attorneys in New York).
See Millemann, supra note 29, at 73-74.
67 SeeJennifer Gerarda Brown, Rethinking "The Practice of Law," 41 EMORY L.J. 451,
454 (1992) (noting barriers such as the expense of an ABA-approved law school, bar
exams and state-by-state admissions).
63 See id. at 454-55; Maher, supra note 36, at 976-82 (discussing relentless efforts of
the Florida Bar Association to enjoin a nonlawyer from preparing legal forms for cli-
ents); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empiri-
cal Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 19 (1981) (noting
that in a majority of jurisdictions the organized bar is the only active enforcer of re-
strictions on law practice).
69 SeeWilliam Mellor, No Jobs, No Work, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1996, at 21 (noting that
the recent addition of 400 taxicab medallions in New York City brings total available
medallions to 12,187-only 400 more than were allowed in 1937).
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ing in the virtual absence of price competition.7
The practice of law, though licensed, is simply not a monopoly or
cartel in any conventional sense of that term. While attorneys of a
bygone age may have successfully squelched competition and ex-
tracted monopoly rents from their clients,7 that is far from the case
today]3 If anything, modem law practice is characterized by competi-
tion among lawyers and law firms]3 As Terrell and Wildman point
out, the only requirement for admission to the bar is a passing score
on the bar exam. 74 With the proliferation of law schools, themselves
now in sharp competition for students,75 there are no longer such
formidable educational barriers to entry. As a result, the bar is now
more economically, socially and racially diverse than at any point in
history.76
Jonathan Macey compellingly argues that contemporary lawyers
earn only "normal," nonmonopoly returns on their investments in
human capital.7 The increase in competition, fueled in part by the
deregulation of advertising 78 and solicitation methods,7 confirms that
the traditional concept of a professional monopoly lacks persuasive
70 Cities also set maximum rates for cab fares. Due to the absence of competition,
however, the legal maximum fare also becomes the de facto minimum. Cab drivers do
not engage in price competition.
71 See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781-83 (1975) (holding that bar
association's minimum fee schedule violated § 1 of the Sherman Act).
See Macey, supra note 33, at 1121 (noting that "[i]f at any time in history the le-
gal profession was a monopoly, it is not any longer").
3 See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381-82 (1977) (holding restraints on lawyer
price advertising unconstitutional); Kenneth Lasson, Lauryering Askew: Excesses in the
Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 723, 741 (stating that following the Bates deci-
sion, "the number of lawyers who advertise has increased dramatically and their radio
and television campaigns have become more aggressive").
74 See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 4, at 410-12 (contrasting the admission re-
quirements of the bar of the past to the bar of today).
75 See Ken Myers, With Fewer Applications and Jobs, Deans Shrink First Year Classes,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 1996, at Al6.
76 See Valerie Fontaine, Progress Report: Women and People of Color in Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 27 (1995); Dana Coleman, Minority
Enrollment Climbs to 24% at State Law Schools, N.J. LAW., May 1, 1995.
77 Macey, supra note 33, at 1122.
78 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637-56 (1985) (holding
that a newspaper advertisement soliciting injury victims is protected speech); Bates,
433 U.S. at 381-82 (holding that advertising by lawyers is constitutionally protected
commercial speech).
See supra note 73; see also Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n,
496 U.S. 91, 106-11 (1990) (holding that a lawyer may advertise certifications); Shap-




C. Moral Obligation and Good Will
Needless to say, invocations of morality, civics and general notions
of professionalism are insufficient to support the imposition of a
mandatory pro bono program.0 No matter how heartfelt it may be,
an appeal to morality can at best motivate voluntary action.s In this
regard, we agree with the comments of Professor Ronald Silverman:
All too many proponents of mandatory pro bono seem to have overre-
lied on a powerful, but ultimately unsatisfying, moral rhetoric. Urgent
and sincere calls to duty, however elegantly phrased and securely an-
chored.., to the best of our professional traditions, may be little more
than empty and unpersuasive moral incantations.82
Of course, there is also a more instrumental aspect to morality
and good will. Perhaps a little morality might rescue lawyers from
their current position at the nadir of public esteem.3 It has been
suggested that one of the principal reasons for the constant outpour-
ing of scorn is the bar's failure to make legal services broadly avail-
able.84  Certainly, there is a broad and visible gap between the
"ceremonial rhetoric"0 of public service and the reality of high fees
and limited access. Rayman Solomon demonstrates persuasively that
such discontinuity has been responsible for past crises in public per-
86ceptions of the legal profession.
Thus, it has been argued that attorneys should improve their im-
See Brown, supra note 67, at 466 n.62; Eldred & Schoenherr, supra note 65, at
393 (stating that "lawyers cannot be mandated to donate their labor... [Piro bono
must remain a matter of individual conscience, to be performed as an act of benevo-
lence and charity, rather than as a matter of professional responsibility" (footnote
omitted)).
81 A person cannot be forced to exercise good will. Any attempt to do so should
be rejected as paternalistic, or worse. See Mary Coombs, Your Money or Your Life: A Mod-
est ProposalforMandatoy Pro Bono Services, 3 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 215, 226 (1993) ("[W]e
ought not require adults to do something because we think it is good for them."
(footnote omitted)).
Ronald H. Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 885, 912 (1991).
83 Is citation really necessary for this point? Heard any good lawyerjokes lately?
84 See Gary A. Hengster, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers, 79 ABAJ. 60, 61
(1993) (discussing a survey that found 43% of the public believed that the provision of
free services would improve the image of lawyers).
83 Gordon, supra note 58, at 24 (footnote omitted).
86 See Solomon, supra note 11, at 144-73.
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87age by implementing pro bono programs. We believe in pro bono
work, and we believe that increased public service would enhance the
reputation of lawyers. Nonetheless, mandatory pro bono plans are, by
definition, enforced by the courts; lawyers who do not comply risk
their licenses and livelihoods. It is not the job of the state to improve
the public perception of the legal profession. Accordingly, image re-
pair, no matter how desirable, cannot provide the rationale for the
establishment of a compulsory pro bono obligation.
II. THE "PUBLIC ASSETS" THEORY
Our public assets theory rests on the proposition that lawyers are
continually engaged in the sale of certain publicly created goods to
their clients. This sale creates a quantum of profit, or rent, that is not
attributable to the lawyers' human capital. A mandatory pro bono
plan can recapture some portion of this profit and return it to the
public as an in-kind assessment.
Some public resources, such as land and money, are tangible.
Others are more conceptual-such as use of airwaves or access to in-
formation. We submit that certain prerogatives of lawyers and their
clients should be classified as public assets. Specifically, the attorney-
client privilege (in its various forms), the work product doctrine, and
certain conflict of interest rules are all publicly created resources,
which we call "lawyer-commodities." These resources are made avail-
able to lawyers, who use them to the advantage of their clients, thus
enhancing the value of their services. In each case, the lawyer and
client receive a publicly created benefit which cannot be employed or
enjoyed by nonlawyers.88
Although the conventional view is that lawyer-assets exist primar-
ily for the benefit of clients, we will demonstrate that they also pro-
duce significant value both for the legal profession and for individual
attorneys. For example, lawyers are able to sell the assurances of pri-
vacy embodied by both the ethical requirements of confidentiality
and the evidentiary attorney-client privilege.8s The work product doc-
87 See IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 11, at 47-50 (discussing a need
for increased pro bono service); Burke et al., supra note 4, at 62 (noting that pro bono
activity could improve the public perception of lawyers).
See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. CL 1923, 1933 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that no federal confidentiality privilege exists for tax advisors or account-
ants).
89 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (mandating that lawyers
generally not "reveal information relating to representation of a client"); MODEL CODE
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trine allows lawyers to guarantee that others will not have access to
the work undertaken on behalf of clients." The conflicts rules en-
gender greater client confidence in lawyers, by preventing them from
turning their abilities against clients in the future9'
Ethics duties and evidentiary privileges are both created and en-
forced by the state. While some commentators see such provisions as• 92
merely filling gaps in attorney-client contracts, the reality is that eth-
ics rules do more than simply lower the cost of negotiating private re-
tention agreements between lawyers and their customers. Ethics rules
are enforced by the disciplinary powers of each jurisdiction. They are
supported by investigative staffs and special adjudicatory bodies. In
other words, they represent the active intervention of state govern-
ment to assure that clients receive the full value of special privileges
such as confidentiality and loyalty. Moreover, each state also protects
extraordinary rights of secrecy between lawyers and clients, not made
available in other professional contexts.
93
Clients pay fees in exchange for the use of these lawyer-assets; but
fees are not the only costs. The invocation of privilege in litigation
makes the discovery process more time consuming and expensive-
not only to clients, but also to the publicly funded judicial system.94
Lawyers benefit doubly, first in the form of higher rates and again in
the form of increased billable hours.
There has been considerable debate in recent years over the util-
ity of the various confidentiality privileges. Some argue that attorneys
are the sole95 or primary9 beneficiaries of the privileges. Others sup-
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 4-101 (requiring that lawyers generally preserve
confidences and secrets of clients); FED. R. EVID. 501 (evidentiary privileges).
90 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3) (party may withhold otherwise discoverable evidence
if it is prepared by or for counsel in anticipation of litigation); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1947) (common law predecessor of Rule 26(b)(3)).
91 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (regulating lawyers' rep-
resentation of clients presenting potential conflicts of interest); see also Ronald Ro-
tunda, Conflicts Problems When Representing Members of Corporate Families, 72 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 655 (1997).
P- SeeMacey & Miller, supra note 7, at 1107-08.
93 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(observing that no federal confidentiality privilege exists for tax advisors or account-
ants; in addition, state psychotherapist privileges have many exceptions and may not
apply to all licensed professionals).
See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Work Product Doctrine, 19J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 360 (1990) (explaining that costs imposed
on discovery are necessary to encourage disclosure).
95 See, e.g., Elizabeth Thornburg, Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1571-
72 (1991) (arguing that the work product doctrine encourages inefficient use of at-
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port the more traditional view that clients need and depend on the
ability to repose confidences in their counsel.9 7 Under any concep-
tion of attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine," however,
attorneys stand in a position to exploit the existence of lawyer-assets."
In the following Sections, we will discuss four distinct lawyer-
assets. The first two assets derive from principles of ethics-the duty
of confidentiality and certain conflict of interest rules. The other two
assets are drawn from the law of evidence-the attorney-client privi-
lege and the work product doctrine. In each case, four conclusions
seem evident: (1) the assets make lawyers' services more valuable to
consumers, thus providing a direct monetary benefit to attorneys; (2)
use of the assets imposes substantial costs on both the legal system
and participants in the system; (3) lawyers are able to shift the costs
created by the exploitation of these publicly created commodities;
and (4) there is no current effort to recapture any of the rents that
accrue to lawyers by virtue of their resale of public assets.
A. Ethics Based Assets
The rules of lawyers' ethics create two assets-confidentiality and
loyalty-which lawyers then sell to clients. In the following Sections
we will explain how the sale of these publicly created commodities
serves to enhance lawyers' income.
1. Confidentiality
Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "a
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent unless the client consents after consultation." 00 Although there
tomey time).
See, e.g., Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate AttorngeClient Privilege: A Study of the
Participants, 63 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 191, 276-86 (1989) (arguing that corporate attorney-
client privilege may encourage retention of outside legal counsel).
97 See Allen et al., supra note 94, at 361-62; Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product
Protection in a Utilitarian World: An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697,
1699 (1995) (noting that confidentiality "enables attorneys to provide the best possi-
ble legal advice" (footnote omitted)).
98 The same conclusions apply as well to certain conflicts rules. See infra Part
IIA2.
Our theory does not rest upon any particular normative conclusion concerning
the desirability of any particular confidentiality rule. So long as the rules exist,
whether optimal or not, they support our public commodities theory.
100 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a). The corresponding
provision in the Model Code is found at MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
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are exceptions to this confidentiality provision, 0' its sweep is broad
indeed. Lawyers are required to maintain the confidentiality not only
of direct communications from their clients, but also of all information
relating to representation, whether or not it originated with the cli-
ent. Moreover, the ethical requirement of confidentiality applies to
all representation of all clients, whether or not in litigation. The con-
fidences of venture capitalists and ordinary taxpayers are protected in
the same manner as those of personal injury plaintiffs and criminal
defendants.
The operative rule, then, commands lawyers to hold in strict con-
fidence all information conveyed by their clients and all other infor-
mation they obtain or develop in the course of representation. The
attorney may not divulge or disclose such information without the cli-
ents' explicit or implied consent,0 3 other than in certain narrowly de-
fined circumstances.'! 4 Additionally, the attorney may not use client
information, even without disclosure, for the benefit of someone
other than the client.' 5 Moreover, as we will develop in the next Sec-
tion, the mere possession of client information, without actual disclo-
sure or use, may nonetheless prohibit the lawyer from accepting fu-
ture representation adverse to the client. t 6
BILrY DR 4-101 (1979). A version of one or the other provision has been adopted in
every United States jurisdiction. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, supra note 14.
101 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (C).
102 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 6.7 (practitioners' ed.,
1986); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmL; MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-4.
103 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) & cmL; MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (C) (1).
Io4 See supra note 101. One exception to the requirement of confidentiality occurs
when the lawyer is ordered by a court to disclose information. The testimonial privi-
lege, however, reduces greatly the likelihood of such an occurrence. See infra Part
II.B.1.
10 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(c); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B)(3); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 102,
§§ 6.7.6 ("Lawyer Self Dealing in Client Information") & 6.7.7 ("Authorized Use of
Client Information").
106 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7 ("Conflict of Interest:
General Rule"), 1.8 ("Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions"), & 1.9 ("Conflict
of Interest: Former Client"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101
("Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independ-
ent Professional Judgment") & DR 5-101 ("Refusing to Accept or Continue Employ-
ment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional
Judgment of the Lawyer").
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These are provisions with some teeth. Lawyers may be subject to
discipline for violating confidentiality rules.10 7 More frequently, law-
yers have been disqualified from cases because of the confidences
that they acquired from former clients.'08 In both circumstances, law-
yers stand to pay significant penalties for violating a client's trust.
Without the existence of lawyers' ethical duties, a client would
undertake serious risk when sharing secret, valuable or sensitive in-
formation with her attorney. The lawyer might be tempted to appro-
priate the information to her own advantage, to sell it to the client's
enemies or competitors, to use it against the client in future negotia-
tions or litigation, or to be careless in keeping the information se-
cure.
Even if the lawyer promised to maintain absolute secrecy, the cli-
ent would still have to worry about cheating. In the absence of ad-
verse consequences, a lawyer might consider cheating whenever the
anticipated value of revealing a confidence was greater than the value
of maintaining a relationship with the client. Without reassurance,
clients would be less willing to engage lawyers and more reluctant to
trust them with confidences once retained.' °9 Lawyers, in turn, would
suffer lower fees, both by the hour and in toto, as invariably happens
in the case of reduced demand.
The problem of trust, of course, exists in most professional or
commercial relationships. It is generally thought that sellers over-
come this dilemma through investment in reputation capital."0 A
107 See, e.g., Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. McGraw, 461 S.E.2d 850, 852 (W. Va. 1995)
(reprimanding the Attorney General of West Virginia for violating client confidential-
ity); In re Lichtenberg, 871 P.2d 981 (N.M. 1994) (suspending lawyer for using pro-
spective client's confidences to benefit another client).
108The origin of the disqualification doctrine lies in the need to protect client
confidences, even after the conclusion of the representation. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD
Research, Inc. 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1982); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528
F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); see also National Med. Enters. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d 123,
124-33 (Tex. 1996) (disqualifying law firm that had received confidences from former
employees of corporation from lawsuit adverse to that corporation); In re Complex
Asbestos Litig., 283 Cal. Rptr. 732, 740-48 (Ct. App. 1991) (disqualifying law firm be-
cause newly hired paralegal had been employed by opposing counsel and therefore
possessed confidential information).
109 This is not to say that lawyers would go out of business. Clients who absolutely
needed lawyers would continue to consult them, even at the risk of disclosed confi-
dences. Clients, however, would resort to their own calculus, conferring with counsel
only when the expected value of the advice exceeded the possible loss from leaked
information. Thus, to the extent that the potential for leakage can be reduced, the
demand for consultation should increase.
110 See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lauyers: Legal Skills and
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cheating seller, in this case a lawyer who has developed a reputation
for violating confidences, would eventually find herself without cli-
ents. Consequently, lawyers profit from investing in reputation capi-
tal, which allows them to attract and keep clients. A good reputation
becomes, in effect, the lawyer's bond; better reputations allow lawyers
to charge premium fees."'
For our current purpose, the crucial observation here is that law-
yers' incomes can be maximized through enhanced assurances of se-
cret keeping. Reputation alone, however, can supply only a limited
level of assurance. This is so for two reasons.
First, buyers of legal services can only verify lawyers' reputations
by incurring high information or search costs. Even then, clients are
not well equipped to evaluate information concerning lawyers, in-
cluding those of apparently high rank,"2 which should lead clients to
mistrust the reliability of information. Also, the greatest quantity of
reputation capital is characteristically accumulated by law firms; cer-
tainly the greatest expenditures on reputation capital are made by
firms."3 On the other hand, clients actually share their confidences
with individual members of those firms. Given sufficient economic
incentive, a single lawyer might be tempted to betray a client if most
of the cost of the betrayal (in the form of damaged reputation) could
essentially be shifted to the firm.
This brings us to the second problem a client faces in relying on
reputation as a bond for lawyers' performance. A bond is effective
only so long as its value is greater than the profit available from cheat-
ing. "1 Should the benefit of disclosing (or appropriating, or sharing,
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Cantractual Performance 89J. POL. ECON. 615, 616 (1981); Karl
S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L. REV. 15, 22 (1995); Oliver L.
Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
519 (1983).
I See Okamoto, supra note 110, at 22-23.
112 See, e.g., Sara Fritz, Hubbell Admits to Fraudulently Billing Clients, LA TIMES, Dec.
7, 1994, at Al (describing how a former Associate United States Attorney General and
partner at Rose Law Firm engaged in fraudulent overbilling); Howard Mintz, Rato's
Free Fall AM. LAW., Sept. 1996, at 60 (questioning why a former Latham & Watkins
partner embezzled hundreds of thousands of dollars from clients and firm); Randall
Samborn, Complaint Puts Fraud at $500K NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1994, at A4 (reporting
that a former managing partner of Winston & Strawn was charged with embezzling
one half-million dollars).
"1 See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OFTHE BIG LAW FIRM 88-108 (1991) (explaining how large law firms
tend to expand their human capital resources--including reputation-continuously).
n4 See Okamoto, supra note 110, at 22 ("[S]o long as the value of the firm-specific
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or diverting) a client's confidences ever outweigh the potential loss of
reputation, 11 then the lawyers' reputation-bond would be correspond-
ingly devalued.
Reputation can provide a certain comfort level to clients, thus jus-
tifying premium fees to lawyers, but its ultimate value is uncertain and
therefore self-limiting. Lawyers, however, are able to extend their cli-
ents greater assurances of confidentiality. In addition to the relatively
insecure bond provided by reputation, lawyers may also guarantee
consumers that the "ethics" of the legal profession ensure the inviola-
bility of client confidences. Lawyers who breach client confidences
not only trespass a moral code, but also disobey an enforceable legal
code. 1 6 Thus, a lawyer who cheats on a client risks not only reputa-
tion capital, but also her license to practice.
In essence, the lawyer's license operates as a performance bond.
The client is assured of the sanctity of her secrets by virtue of the law-
yer's interest in maintaining membership in the bar. Unlike reputa-
tion, licensure is relatively easy to verify (thus reducing the client's in-
formation costs) and has a high personal value to each lawyer (thus
reducing the client's uncertainty). One might wonder whether ethics
alone would provide a greater assurance to clients than reputation
alone. But it is a moot question; lawyers offer both bonds. The in-
quiry is not whether the ethics-asset provides the most value, but only
whether it provides added value.
While reputation capital is primarily self-generated, lawyers' eth-
ics-assets are not. The value created by the ethics rules is given to law-
yers, not accumulated by them."7 The duty of confidentiality is cre-
ated by the state and enforced through publicly funded mechanisms
investment, that is, the income stream generated by the reputation for quality, exceeds
the profit obtainable from a single incident of cheating, the firm will not cheat.").
I' Consider the actions of attorney Michael Khourie. Mr. Khourie, while repre-
senting the plaintiffs in a nationwide class action, secretly approached an attorney for
the defendant corporation and offered to "abandon and dismiss" the class action in
exchange for a confidential payment of "$8 to $10 million to him personally; the class
would receive nothing." Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d
207, 210 (Ct. App. 1997).
116 For example, in the case of Michael Khourie, see supra note 115, the California
appellate court imposed sanctions that went well beyond loss of reputation. As a con-
sequence of Mr. Khourie's offer to "sell out" his clients, the court disqualified him
from all participation in the litigation and limited his right to seek attorney's fees. Cal
Pak Delivery, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214-16. Mr. Khourie's actions would also seem to
make him a prime candidate for professional discipline. As of this writing, however, it
is not known what actions the California bar counsel may take against Mr. Khourie.
117 The fee premium attributable to reputation capital is a return on investment;
the fee premium attributable to ethics-assets comes in the form of a rent or quasi-rent.
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of investigation and discipline." 8 These publicly supported infrastruc-
tures serve to further reduce clients' information and enforcement
costs, which might otherwise discount the fee premium available to
lawyers. Lawyers, therefore, are able to offer the ultimate perform-
ance bond as a guarantee of confidentiality-the lawyer offers her li-
cense as a hostage, with the state acting as the stakeholder.
Most commentators would agree that the confidentiality rules are
intended to protect clients and serve social ends," 9 not to increase
lawyers' fees. Nonetheless, the confidentiality rules have the effect of
contributing to lawyers' incomes. That this consequence is largely
unintended only strengthens the argument in favor of recapturing
some of those earnings for public use.
2. Conflicts of Interest
Conflict of interest rules are closely related to the confidentiality
principle. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain several
provisions delineating lawyers' responsibilities in this regard."O Rule
1.7 contains the general principle that a lawyer may not represent a
client if the representation will be directly adverse to another client,
or if the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's own
interests or by responsibilities to another client or a third person.
Rule 1.8 prohibits lawyers from engaging in certain transactions with
clients, sets strict standards for entering business relationships with
clients, and bars lawyers from using client confidences "to the disad-
vantage of the client."'2 Rule 1.9 prohibits a lawyer from acting ad-
versely to a former client in the "same or a substantially related mat-
ter. ' 2' Finally, Rule 1.10 imputes a lawyer's disqualification to her
entire law firm.1
4
11 SeeWOLFRAM, supra note 102, at 82-85 (detailing state disciplinary agencies and
structures).
1 See, e.g., id. at 297-99 (discussing the evolution of the "confidentiality princi-
ple").
120 The prior Model Code of Professional Responsibility contained provisions sub-
stantially similar to most of the requirements now found in the Model Rules. In a few
cases, such as suing former clients, the Model Code was silent, but case law decided
under the Model Code reached essentially the same result as was subsequently codi-
fied in the Model Rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrIY Canon 5
Notes (1983), and cases cited therein.
121 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
12 Id. atRule 1.8.
123 Id. atRule 1.9.
124 Id. atRule 1.10.
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Taken together, these rules protect a client's ability to rely upon
the loyalty of her counsel. A client may confide in her lawyer all
manner of confidences, strategies, plans, vulnerabilities and aspira-
tions, secure in the knowledge that the lawyer's access to this informa-
tion will not come back to haunt her. Rule 1.7(a), for example, as-
sures the client that her lawyer will not bring even an unrelated
action against her during the course of the representaton.'25 In the
same vein, Rule 1.9 prevents lawyers from switching sides, even after
being discharged.'26
These are valuable assets. They protect clients' expectations and
allow them to make greater use of attorneys. Some clients, of course,
have no choice but to consult and trust counsel. A criminal defen-
dant virtually has to have a lawyer, and the absence of conflicts rules
would be unlikely to increase the incidence of pro se defense. But the
need of other clients, including many of the most lucrative, is more
contingent. Corporate and other business transaction clients would
retain fewer attorneys (or would retain them less extensively) if they
could not be certain of their lawyers' loyalty.
2 7
As with confidentiality in general, reputation capital can also per-
form a bonding function. A lawyer or law firm that developed a repu-
tation for switching sides would quickly face a diminishing client base.
Nonetheless, without a regime of enforcement, the economic benefit
of switching sides might, in some cases, overwhelm the cost in lost
reputation.
The ethics rules, however, absolutely prevent lawyers from switch-
ing sides, rather than merely penalizing them for doing so (in the
12 The client may consent to the lawyer undertaking such adverse representation,
but only following consultation and full disclosure. Id. at Rule 1.7(a) (2).
26 Again, the client can consent. Id. at Rule 1.9(a).
27 Professor Fred C. Zacharias suggests to the contrary that most lawyers "would
argue that conflicts rules ... hurt their business." Letter from Fred Zacharias, Herzog
Scholar and Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, to Steven Lubet,
Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law 3 (Aug. 19, 1996) (on file
with authors). Professor Timothy Terrell makes the same point: "Practicing lawyers
understand themselves to be constrained by conflicts rules .... " Letter from Timothy
Terrell, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law, to Steven Lubet 5 (Aug. 20,
1996) (on file with authors).
We agree that many attorneys may hold that view, but the perception cannot be
accurate. The disqualification of one lawyer requires the employment of another.
Thus, the total volume of legal business cannot be hurt by the conflicts rules, and it
almost certainly goes up somewhat due to the necessary duplication of effort. Of
course, the bitter experience of being booted out of a case or transaction is no doubt
more memorable than the client who was referred due to another lawyer's conflict.
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form of reputation cost). The development of the disqualification
motion or petition makes it certain that one's lawyer cannot be hired
away by an opponent or direct competitor, and cannot even defect
after being fired.2 2 The client does not need to contract for this pro-
tection, and does not need to indulge in costly information searches.
Imagine the negotiation that might occur in the absence of a conflicts
rule:
CLIENT: I would like to hire you, but only if I can be certain
you will never take on representation adverse to me, in this or
in any related matter.
COUNSEL: Don't worry. I promise not to do it.
CLIENT: How can I be sure?
COUNSEL: I will lose reputation capital if I switch sides. My
reputation is my bond.
CLIENT: That is not a very good bond. What if my case turns
out to be more valuable than your reputation? If you can't
provide a better bond, I will insist on discounting your fee to
account for your uncertain loyalty.
The ethics rules, however, allow the lawyer to provide the client
with a nearly ironclad assurance. "I cannot switch sides. Not only
would that endanger my license, but the court will throw me out of
the case if I try."'29
The provisions of Rules 1.7 and 1.9 seem to focus on litigation
clients, but in reality they are not so limited. Business clients are
guaranteed that their lawyers will act with fidelity, and will not organ-
ize transactions with others' interests in mind. They are also pro-
tected against being sued (by their own attorneys or their firms) in
the future, should a deal go bad. Moreover, Rule 1.8 gives additional
assurances to strictly transactional clients: their lawyers cannot appro-
priate the benefits of the deal, and cannot structure legal arrange-
1 See, e.g., Cardona v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 968, 975 (D.NJ. 1996)
(side-switching attorney must be disqualified in order to protect client who "freely
shared with the attorney secrets and confidences with the expectation that they would
be disclosed to no one else").
129 To be sure, some disqualification motions are more marginal than others.
Sometimes lawyers are disqualified by courts, sometimes the motions fail. The re-
ported cases, however, only recount the situations where lawyers attempted to sue
their current or former clients; by definition, those would be the cases where the dis-
qualification rules were least likely to apply. The reported cases obviously do not cap-
ture the overwhelming majority of instances where lawyers were effectively deterred
from even trying to change sides.
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ments to serve themselves at the expense of their clients.'"
Each of these protections is publicly created and publicly en-
forced. Each adds to the value of lawyers' services by making them
more desirable and dependable. As with pure confidentiality, attor-
neys are able to sell conflicts-assets.
3
B. Evidence-Based Assets
The ethics principle of confidentiality serves to restrain lawyers'
voluntary actions. It is therefore arguable that an attorney's interest
in preserving reputation capital will also restrain counsel, thereby ful-
filling some of the same functions as the confidentiality rules. From
the client's perspective, however, there remains the potential prob-
lem of compelled disclosure via discovery or subpoenaed testimony.
In this regard, reputation capital is worthless. If ordered by a court to
reveal client secrets, the lawyer is helpless and must obey whatever the
cost to her reputation. To the extent that communications to counsel
are vulnerable to such exposure, the value of a lawyer's services is di-
minished.
Once again, however, lawyers' incomes are fortified by virtue of
their access to publicly created commodities. In addition to ethics-
assets, attorneys are empowered to sell to their clients certain evi-
dence-based protections. Both the evidentiary attorney-client privi-
lege and the closely connected work product doctrine allow lawyers to
offer further guarantees of secrecy to their clients, even in the face of
demands from adversaries or courts. These protections come at no
cost to lawyers, and pose no risk to reputation capital, yet they impose
substantial costs on third parties. The ability to shift those costs, of
course, contributes further value to lawyers' services, which may be
realized in the form of fees.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the rule of evidence that permits a
lawyer to refuse to testify in court concerning communications be-
tween herself and her client. The privilege is considerably narrower
ISO See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (1983) (governing
business transactions with clients); Rule 1.8(b) (prohibiting use of confidential infor-
mation to disadvantage of client); Rule 1.8(c) (limiting gifts or bequests from clients
to lawyers and their families); Rule 1.8(d) (prohibiting acquisition of literary rights
before conclusion of representation).
1 For an argument to the contrary, see supra note 127.
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in scope than the ethical principle of confidentiality, since it applies
only to "communications" (and not to other information relating to
the representation). 32 On the other hand, the privilege may be more
sturdy than the ethical principle, since it protects the client not only
from the lawyer's voluntary (or negligent) lapses, but also from com-
pelled disclosure in court.' ss The privilege, though obviously ger-
mane only once litigation is pending, 34 applies to all confidences
shared between clients and their lawyers, including those that take
place in the context of transactional practice and business counseling.
Communications do not need to be in contemplation of litigation in
order to be protected, 5 and the privilege continues to apply even af-
ter the death of the client 36
Every United States jurisdiction has adopted some version of the
attorney-client privilege. 37 In the federal cases, the privilege exists by
virtue of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. ' The history of the
attorney-client privilege, of course, is far older than the federal rules;
132 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1983) (stating that
the requirement of confidentiality extends to situations beyond those where evidence
is being sought); WOLFRAM, supra note 102, § 6.7 (comparing evidentiary rule with eth-
ics requirement of confidentiality); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.
GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5472, at 89-90 (1986)
(stating that the attorney-client privilege "is concerned with the question of when
courts can compel the disclosure of confidential communications between attorney
and client; the duty of confidentiality imposes an obligation on the attorney to keep
his client's confidences, whether in or out of court").
133 See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
fact-finding done by attorneys comes within the attorney-client privilege); Hitt v. Ste-
phens, 675 N.E.2d 275, 278-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that the will-contest excep-
tion to the attorney-client privilege does not apply to files used by the defendant in
representing a client's estate which has been closed).'34. ..Although it is most frequently utilized in the course of litigation, the privilege
may also be invoked in other dispute-resolution contexts such as arbitration, tax
audits, regulatory compliance and mediation.
135 See, e.g., Hitt, 675 N.E.2d at 278 (noting that statements made in the course of
estate planning are held privileged even many years after the death of the client).
136 See id,
137 See WOLFRAM, supra note 102, § 6.3.1, at 250.
13 "[T]he privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light
of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501. Federal courts may apply state law privi-
lege doctrines in diversity cases. See generally 2J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 1 501[02]. Until 1996, the attorney-client privilege was the only common
law privilege recognized by the United States Supreme Court, and therefore applica-
ble in federal cases, pursuant to Rule 501. On February 26, 1996, the Court decided
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), which, for the first time, accepted under Rule
501 a claim of psychotherapist privilege. See id. at 1931.
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it was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v.
Blackburn in 1888, when the Court held that the privilege was
"founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of
justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled
in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed
of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclo-
sure."
13 9
Since Hunt v. Blackburn, the existence of the attorney-client evi-
dentiary privilege has hardly been debated in the courts. 40 Subse-
quent cases have, however, focused on the scope of the privilege. Up-
john Co. v. United States, for example, extended the privilege to
corporations.
41
The most common rationale for the privilege is that it encourages
candid communications between lawyer and client, 4t including unfa-
vorable information that the client might otherwise withhold.' Pro-
fessor Ronald Allen and his coauthors posit that the attorney-client
privilege has the effect of increasing the opposition's cost of acquir-
ing information, and that it therefore encourages clients to share un-
favorable information with counsel.' 44 Client candor, in turn, is said
to lead to better representation, '4 as well as to counsel's increased
ability to encourage compliance with the law.'4
Other scholars are critical of the "candor" rationale. Some argue
139 Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
140 Scholars, however, have questioned its need or utility. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 147-48.
141 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (holding that communications made by a litigant's
employees are covered by the attorney-client privilege to the extent that they are an-
swers to questionnaires or interview questions).
12 See id. at 389 (stating that the privilege facilitates "full and frank communica-
tion between attorneys and their clients").
'4 See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 4 (1975)
(agreeing with the theory that, in order to effectively represent a client, an attorney
must know all that her client knows); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING
LAWYERS' ETHICS 87-109 (1990) (discussing privilege in a chapter entitled, "Lawyer-
Client Trust and Confidence"); Note, supra note 97, at 1699 (asserting that a lawyer's
ability to give the best possible advice depends on client openness).
14 SeeAllen et al., supra note 94, at 369.
15 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 132, § 5472, at 80-
82. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Are the Model Rules Constitutional?, 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 685 (1981).
'4 See Vincent C. Alexander, The Corporate Attorney-Client Pivilege: A Study of the Par-
ticipants, 63 ST.JOHN's L. REV. 191, 213-14 (1989) ("[D]eprived of complete informa-
tion, the attorney cannot give the most competent legal advice, and the administration
of'justice will suffer either because of the perpetuation of meritless litigation or non-
compliance with the law.").
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that clients have a deep and apparent interest in providing truthful
information to their attorneys, whether the communications are privi-
147leged or not. If so, the privilege would have little or no effect on
the actual quality of representation.
14
1
The resolution of this debate is not necessary to our theory.
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege is essential to competent
representation, it is apparent that the privilege is highly valued by
both lawyers and their customers. In one survey, forty-five percent of
lawyers and thirty-one percent of business executives responded that
the attorney-client privilege "increases the frequency of consulta-
tion. "14 A majority of both lawyers and executives believed that the
privilege encourages candor,'50 and many also suggested that it fosters
an atmosphere of client comfort 5' Another survey suggested that the
privilege promotes the perception of lawyers as "hired guns." 52 While
this image is distasteful to some, it is obviously desirable to clients in
search of gunslingers. Thus, Professor Fred Zacharias has observed
that "the presence of confidentiality may explain why clients are will-
ing to pay high fees to lawyers when non-lawyers might be able to
provide similar services more cheaply."
53
Indeed, the attorney-client privilege may have greater value to cli-
ents if it is unnecessary or even socially undesirable. Assuming argu-
endo that frank communication would nonetheless take place be-
tween lawyers and clients without the privilege, it should be obvious
that clients would prefer that their bad facts be kept secret. Can there
be any doubt that secrecy, especially concerning potentially compro-
mising information, is valuable and sought after? Perhaps it is for this
reason that lawyers frequently admit to making "tactical use" of the
privilege, employing it after-the-fact to thwart discovery rather than to
promote candor in the first instance. '4 Call it zeal or call it obstruc-
147 See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate At-
torney-Client Privileg 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 157, 174-79 (1993) (discussing other in-
centives for client candor); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOwA L.
REV. 351, 367-69 (1989) (asserting that a feeling of confidentiality alone is not justifi-
cation for the privilege).
148 See Alexander, supra note 146, at 375; Thornburg, supra note 147, at 179-82;
Zacharias, supra note 147, at 36667.
4 SeeAlexander, supra note 146, at 248.
150 See id. at 244.
151 See id.
152 See Zacharias, supra note 147, at 360.
13 1ad.
15 SeeAlexander, supra note 146, at 243-44.
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tionism, it is clearly an attractive commodity. It may be that wise so-
cial policy does not truly require an attorney-client privilege; all the
more reason for clients to want its protection and to be willing to pay
for it.i '
2. Work Product Doctrine
Additionally, some lawyers sell clients the protection of the work
product doctrine. 5 6 While the attorney-client privilege shields the
client's confidential communications, the work product doctrine ap-
plies to the lawyer's thoughts and conclusions. Thus, lawyers may re-
sist production in discovery (and therefore the evidentiary use) of
"documents and tangible things ... prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion,"' 7 as a means of safeguarding the client's exclusive access to her
lawyer's mental processes and opinions.'8 The work product doctrine
is thought to foster and promote attorney diligence,' 59 which obvi-
ously should be of great value to clients. Because work product pro-
tection applies only to material developed in the course of litigation,
its scope is far more narrow than that of the attorney-client privilege,
which applies to all confidential communications whatever their con-
text. Transactional lawyers, for example, may never have occasion to
invoke the work product doctrine. Still, the doctrine affords signifi-
cant, and therefore valuable, shelter to those who are able to employ
it.
First announced by the United States Supreme Court in Hickman
v. Taylor,' 6° the work product doctrine has since been included in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure6' and accepted by every state. In the
'5 See, e.g., United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
attorney-client privilege prevails despite academic criticism of its effect).
156The work product protection is variously described as a qualified immunity or a
privilege. See generally Kathleen Waits, Opinion Work Product: A C7itical Analysis of Current
Law and a New Analytical Framework, 73 OR. L. REv. 385, 391-94 (1994). The difference
between the two descriptions, if there is one, is not germane to our theory. Lawyers
resell the protection of the doctrine, no matter how it is best classified analytically.
Solely for the sake of consistency, we tend to use the term "privilege."
M FED. R .Civ. P. 26(b) (3).
15 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) ("At its core, the work-
product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged
area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's case."); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) ("[lit is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of
privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.").
159 SeeAlexander, supra note 146, at 214-15.
160 329 U.S. 495, 510-12 (1947).
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3).
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years since Hickman the work product privilege has expanded to cover
documents prepared for attorneys by their agents,112 and resistance to
subpoenas as well as to formal discovery'63 In addition, "carry over
immunity" permits lawyers to assert work product protection even af-
ter the conclusion of the litigation for which the documents were
prepared.'r Still, the work product doctrine must be regarded as the
least valuable of the lawyer-assets under discussion. This is because,
unlike the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine re-
mains restricted to documents and information produced in
"anticipation of litigation," and therefore its benefits are limited to
relatively few lawyers and their clients.
Various rationales have been proffered in support of the work
product privilege. In Hickman, the Supreme Court expressed the
concern that absent such privilege, "[ain attorney's thoughts, hereto-
fore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and
sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice
and in the preparation of cases for trial.... And the interests of the
clients and the cause ofjustice would be poorly served."'
65
Thoughtfully expanding upon this analysis, Professor Allen and
his coauthors concluded that the work product rule is necessary to
enable an attorney to undertake the "optimal amount of legal investi-
gation."'' Since investigation and research typically produce both
good and bad information, a lawyer otherwise might be reluctant to
explore all avenues for fear of having to share any damaging results
with the opposition.'67
The work product privilege may also be seen as akin to a property
right in information: An evidentiary privilege is a right to withhold
information unless the adversary makes a concession (pays a price)
worth enough to induce the privilege holder to waive (sell) his rights.
The privilege is thus a species of property right in information. And
it is a right against the world'6s
162 See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238-39 ("It is therefore necessary that the doctrine protect
material prepared for the attorney as well as those prepared by the attorney himself.").
163 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981) (holding that the work
product doctrine applies to IRS summonses).
16 D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and Carr-Over Immunity:
An Assessment of TheirJustifications, 47 U. PriT. L. REV. 675, 679-81(1986).
1' Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
16 Allen et al, supra note 94, at 362.
167 See id. at 386-87.
168 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiarj Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 313-314; see also Morrow v. Brown,
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Under either conception, the work product doctrine plainly ad-
vantages lawyers' clients by allowing the suppression of otherwise
relevant information. 69 At a minimum, this capability, conferred via
publicly created legal doctrine, increases the value of lawyers' efforts
by broadening the scope of risk-free research and investigation.
When the work product privilege is viewed as a property right, it be-
comes even more apparent that lawyers have been granted access to a
wealth-producing public asset, which they proceed to barter and sell
on behalf of both their clients and themselves.
70
Critics of the work product doctrine dispute its necessity and so-
cial utility, arguing that lawyers have a strong incentive to prepare
adequately and diligently even if the product of their labors might
eventually be discoverable by an adversary.' 71 Thus, they contend that
the work product privilege does not lead to more extensive investiga-
tion (that is, the production of case-specific knowledge), but only to
justice-defeating suppression of the information gained.'n
A superfluous benefit, however, is a benefit nonetheless. Lawyers
and clients are assertively eager to utilize the advantages of the work
product doctrine, 73 all the more so because the asset is provided free
Todd & Heyburn, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 173, at *8-9 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 1996)
(holding that law firm has an independent right to assert work product protection on
its own behalf, notwithstanding client's waiver); RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 244 (1981) ("[T]he attorney-work product-doctrine is, I think, best under-
stood as the use of secrecy to protect the lawyer's (and hence the client's) investment
in research and analysis of a case.").
169The lawyer, however, cannot invoke work product protection against her own
client with regard to material amassed in the course of representing that client. See
Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 424, 427 (S.D. W. Va. 1994); Gottlieb v. Wiles, 143 F.R.D.
241, 247 (D. Colo. 1992); Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). This exception, of course, makes the work product rule, and hence
the lawyer's services, even more valuable to the client.
See Morrow, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS 173, at *9 (holding that law firm has inde-
pendent right to assert work product protection on its own behalf, notwithstanding
client's waiver).
See Elizabeth Thornburg, supra note 147; D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney
Work Product Doctrine and Carny-Over Immunity: An Assessment of TheirJustifications, 47 U.
PITT. L. REV. 675, 687 (1986); cf In re Special Sept. 1978 GrandJury (II), 640 F.2d 49,
62 (7th Cir. 1980) (work product doctrine provides "a protected area in which the law-
yer can prepare his case free from adversarial scrutiny"); Morrow, 1996 Ky. App. LEXIS
173, at *9 (work product doctrine protects "thought processes of the attorney in
evaluating and litigating a claim from being subsequently obtained and used against
him or her").
IV SeeWells, supra note 171, at 685 ("The goals ofjustice are not merely to provide
incentives for the adversary system.").
13 See, e.g., Morrow, 1996 Ky. Ct. App. LEXIS 173, at *8-9; THOMAS MAUET,
PRETRIAL 178 (1993) (attorneys should include lawyer observations and opinions
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of charge, courtesy of the public. This does not mean, however, that
there are no associated costs. The following Section addresses the
"price" of both the attorney-client and work product privileges.
3. Costs of Evidentiary Privileges
Attorneys have been successful both at appropriating the benefits
and shifting the costs of evidentiary privileges. There would be a sig-
nificant negative impact on attorneys' incomes if the direct costs of
the evidentiary privileges were borne by lawyers. In addition, if the
costs of the privileges were fully passed through to clients who em-
ployed their protections, lawyers would necessarily suffer either de-
creased employment or reduced fees. As it is, however, the primary
financial burdens generated by the evidentiary privileges are spread
across the entire judicial system.
a. Suppression of Truth
It should come as no surprise that evidentiary privileges result in
the suppression of truth.' 74 That is their intended function. Propo-
nents of privileges typically argue that the trade-off between access to
truth and respect for privacy is reasonable, necessary and fair.175 Crit-
ics, however, contend that recognized privileges are overbroad and
can lead to injustice. 76
A frequent pro-privilege argument is that recognition of a privi-
lege is virtually cost-free, since the protected communications would
not occur if unprivileged. The Supreme Court explained this prem-
ise in Upjohn: "Application of the attorney-client privilege to commu-
nications.., puts the adversary in no worse position than if the com-
munications had never taken place. The privilege only protects
throughout summaries of witness statements, so as to gain work product protection
from disclosure); DAN WEBB ET AL., CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS § 4.05[2]
(1993) (lawyers' written notes should weave together facts and mental impressions, so
as to be nondiscoverable under work product doctrine).
174 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that "[t]estimonial privileges... 'are in derogation of the search for truth'"
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974))).
See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 94, at 360 (recognizing that "the rules of confi-
dentiality are costly" and that they "constrain openness," but arguing that these costs
"are not regrettable" because confidentiality encourages client disclosure to her attor-
ney who may "guide the litigation in directions unanticipated by the client").
176 See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 147, at 159 ("[T]he privilege actually does great
harm to the truth seeking function of litigation and imposes tremendous costs on the
litigants and on thejudicial system as a whole.")
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disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the
underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney
,,177
The Court recently reiterated this belief in Jaffee v. Redmond:
"Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which liti-
gants ... seek access-for example, admissions against interest by a
party-is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken 'evidence' will
therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been
spoken and privileged." 78
The assumption of cost-free privileges, however, has been sharply
criticized. Clients, both in and out of litigation, have enormous in-
centives to make full disclosure to their attorneys, even in the absence
of an evidentiary privilege. As Professor Allen and his coauthors ob-
served, "one of the effects of the privilege must be to raise the cost of
obtaining useful information once it is in the hands of the attor-
ney.
" 179
There is no empirical support for the proposition that clients
would routinely withhold communications with counsel rather than
risk discovery. On the other hand, Justice Scalia's dissent in Jaffee
makes an almost incontrovertible case that much communication be-
tween clients and professionals is indifferent to privilege. Respond-
ing to the majority's position that truthful communication is inhib-
ited by the absence of evidentiary protection, Justice Scalia queried:
"If that is so, how come psychotherapy got to be a thriving practice
before the 'psychotherapist privilege' was invented? Were the pa-
tients paying money to lie to their analysts all those years?"'8 0
Indeed. Corporations routinely channeled information to their
attorneys long before the Court recognized a corporate privilege.'8 '
Lawyers gathered information via intermediaries before those com-
munications were reliably privileged.' 2 Can there be any doubt that
attorneys assiduously assembled work product well in advance of
177 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
:' Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1929.
19 Allen et al., supra note 94, at 361.
80 Jaffee, 116 S. Ct. at 1935 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
:81 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95 (extending the attorney-client privilege to com-
munications from corporate employees to the counsel for the corporation).
182 See U.S. v. Koval, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (interpreter); Pratt v. State, 39 Md.
App. 442 (1978) (psychiatrist); cf Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405, 414
(1976) (holding that an accountant's documents transferred by client to attorney are
not entitled to attorney-client privilege as the documents involved no self-
incriminating testimony).
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Hickman v. Taylo.' 83 To this day it seems fairly safe to assume that cli-
ents are reasonably candid with their accountants, tax advisors, pri-
vate investigators, business counselors, real estate brokers and estate
planners, notwithstanding the absence of an evidentiary privilege that
thoroughly covers those law-related professions.
8 4
In short, the evidentiary privileges exact a price in the form of in-
formation suppression. Lawyers would hardly fight so hard for them
if it were otherwise. The suppression of information, in turn, may re-
sult in the frustration ofjustice. "That is the cost of every rule which
excludes reliable and probative evidence-or at least every one cate-
gorical enough to achieve its announced policy objective."'
83
We do not presume here to resolve the policy disputes over the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Perhaps the
gain in candid counseling is worth the lost information, perhaps not.
It is sufficient for our purpose to recognize that evidentiary privileges
impose a significant and diffuse social cost, and that lawyers pay no
direct share of the price as they commandeer their benefits.
b. Increased Litigation Costs
A further cost of evidentiary privileges comes in the form of in-
creased litigation expenses. Professor Allen and his coauthors have
established fairly conclusively that evidentiary privileges multiply liti-
gation and discovery expenses. As evidence, they point to the exis-
tence of numerous reported cases dealing with work product and at-
torney-client privilege issues. 86 If the information sought in those
cases could have been acquired easily or inexpensively through other
means, the requesting parties obviously would not have resorted to
litigation.' 87 Increased litigation, of course, is a boon to working law-
yers, as it generates additional billable hours.8 Clients pay for those
183 329 U.S. 495 (1947). For a discussion of the work product doctrine, see supra
Part II.B.2.
184 See, e.g.,Jaffe 116 S. Ct. at 1935 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that patients
would not pay "money to lie to their analysts all those years" before the existence of a
federal psychotherapist-patient privilege).
185 Id. at 1932 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
18 SeeAllen et al., supra note 94, at 363.
187 See id.
S SeeNancy D. Holt, Are LongerHours Here to Stay?, 79 A.B.A.J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 64
(noting that a 1990 ABA survey reveals that 50% of lawyers work more than 200 hours
per month); Judith L. Maute, Balanced Lives in a Stressful Profession: An Impossible
Dream?, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 797, 802, 805 (1992) (noticing "the usual pressure for more
business and billings" and that "some firms expect as much as twenty-five hundred bil-
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hours, and public taxes pay for the courts' time and support person-
nel.
The work product privilege additionally results in duplication of
investigation. While the sharing of all relevant material might be
more efficient for all concerned, the work product doctrine allows
lawyers to withhold their own knowledge. Thus, each side neatly
generates further billings for opposing counsel.' 89
Finally, evidentiary privileges impose even greater discovery costs
in the corporate context. Under the Upjohn holding, opposing coun-
sel may now be required to take the depositions of many employees
who otherwise might simply have been interviewed.10 Depositions are
expensive for clients, but they are lucrative for lawyers.''
c. Work Shifting to High-Priced Providers
One expensive effect of attorneys' unique access to secrecy is the
shifting of work from low-price to high-price providers. There is of-
ten considerable overlap between the work of lawyers and that of
other professionals. Accountants, bankers, real estate agents, invest-
lable hours a year").
189 One might posit that clients could contract around this problem by agreeing to
share their attorneys' work product. No doubt certain institutional repeat-players have
adopted such cost sharing approaches. For most clients, however, such a tactic would
be impossible. First, clients are at an information disadvantage. It would be difficult
for all but the most sophisticated to ignore counsel's advice to maintain the secrecy of
work product. Furthermore, each individual client would be handicapped by uncer-
tainty, unable to predict whether the information provided would outweigh the in-
formation received. Thus, in the vast majority of cases the work product privilege ef-
fectively protects the attorney's intellectual capital from appropriation by either the
opposition or the attorney's own client.
190 Upjohn extends the attorney-client privilege beyond the so-called "control
group" to cover employee communications relevant to the subject matter of the litiga-
tion. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95 (holding that corporate employees' communica-
tions to the counsel for the corporation are protected by the attorney-client privilege).
Furthermore, in many situations the Rules of Professional Conduct operate to prohibit
an attorney from interviewing the employees of an opposing corporation. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 4.2 (1983) ("In representing a client, a
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."); Alexander, supra
note 146, at 230 (noting that opposing counsel is rarely granted permission to inter-
view corporate employees). But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (interpreting Model Rule 4.2 as not extending to con-
tact with former employees of an adverse corporate party).
191 Again, clients might attempt to avoid unnecessary deposition taking, but they
face the same information deficits discussed supra note 189.
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ment counselors, tax preparers, estate planners, private investigators,
business advisors and others all offer some of the same services as at-
torneys. To their competitive advantage, 92 lawyers alone are able to
offer guaranteed secrecy--secured by their access to both the eviden-
tiary privileges and the ethical confidentiality principle.
The accounting profession provides a useful case in point. Both
lawyers and accountants are capable of preparing tax returns and
providing tax planning advice. Indeed, the work of the two profes-
sions is often identical. Accountants, however, do not have the same
broad access to secrecy rights as do lawyers. There is no common law
testimonial privilege for accountants. 93 Although a number of states
have enacted statutory accountant-client privileges, these are typically
far weaker than the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, no ac-
countant-client privilege obtains in federal court,'9 5 nor is there fed-
eral work product protection for accountants' opinions, conclusions
or papers.
Thus, information provided to accountants is vulnerable to com-
pelled disclosure, notwithstanding its potentially "sensitive and confi-
IV_ SeeAlexander, supra note 146, at 282 (noting one attorney's belief that access to
privilege creates a "competitive edge over accountants").
For a stark example, consider Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH)
645 (1990), in which the Tax Court denied favorable tax treatment to an estate to the
tune of somewhere between one million and three million dollars. See id. at 648. Spe-
cifically, the court held that the decedent, on the advice of her accountant and tax
advisor, had made certain gifts of stock purely to reduce the federal transfer tax and
not actually to divest herself of control of a closely held corporation. See id. As proof
of the decedent's invalid intent, the Tax Court relied on a series of communications
between the decedent and her accountant. See id. at 647-48. In contrast, had the es-
tate planning advice come from an attorney, the content would have been privileged
and therefore unavailable to the Tax Court. See Hitt v. Stephens, 675 N.E.2d 275-78
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding that estate planning documents are protected by the at-
torney-client privilege, even 40 years after the testator's death). The lesson of this cau-
tionary tale is that confidentiality is worth money-in Estate of Murphy, rightly or
wrongly, over a million bucks-and that the attorney-client privilege can be well worth
whatever it costs.
9 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) ("[N]o confidential ac-
countant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has
been recognized in federal cases." (citations omitted)).
194 See Gary Lawson & Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third Party
Liability ofAccountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309,
1315 (1991) (noting that about one-third of the states have statutes protecting ac-
countant-client communications).
195 See Couch, 409 U.S. at 335.
19 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405, 414 (1976).
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dential" nature. 97 One simply cannot entrust work to an accountant
with any secure expectation that it will remain private and personal.'9
Consequently, a certain volume of work, where inviolability is prized,
will necessarily be transferred from relatively lower-price providers to
higher-price attorneys.'
C. Summary
We recognize that the public assets theory is not wholly distinct
from the monopoly theory of pro bono obligations. Both approaches
derive from the recognition of attorneys' unique access to the courts
and other aspects of the practice of law. To that extent, one might
even regard the public assets analysis as an elaboration upon or re-
finement of the more venerable monopoly theory.
We believe, however, that we go well beyond the monopoly theory
in our examination and understanding of the public's direct contri-
bution to lawyers' capital, and therefore to lawyers' fees.
III. CONDITIONED ACCESS TO INFORMATION-ASSETS: OTHER EXAMPLES
The nub of our theory is that lawyers have exclusive access to cer-
tain publicly created information-assets, and that a pro bono obliga-
tion may be extracted as a condition of their use. A requirement of
pro bono legal work is a type of in-kind exchange. The public assets
enhance the lawyer's legal services for paying clients, in return for
which the lawyer may be expected to provide a small amount of simi-
197 See Lawson & Mattison, supra note 194, at 1314-15 (noting that an "accountant's
work product... is not protected by common-law evidentiary privileges"); see also Estate
of Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 647-48, 658 (denying favorable estate tax treatment on
the basis of decedent's apparent intent, as revealed by "less than subtle" advice letters
from decedent's accountant).
198 But cf. Couch, 409 U.S. at 342 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
decision to compel disclosure of client documents in the possession of an accountant
as encouraging not "trusting anyone with even temporary custody of documents we
want to protect from public disclosure").
199 A comparable phenomenon exists with regard to fact investigation. When
conducted by nonlawyers, fact investigation, even when carried out in contemplation
of litigation, is not protected from compelled disclosure. See United States v. Rowe, 96
F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996). On the other hand, if lawyers are engaged to pursue
an investigation, virtually all communications are protected, even where there is no
specific retention for the purpose of providing legal advice. See id. (noting that "fact-
finding which pertains to legal advice counts as 'professional legal services'" and hold-
ing that communications to a partner by young associates asked by the partner to in-
vestigate another attorney's conduct to the partner are privileged).
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lar services free of charge.
This sort of conditioned, in-kind payment is hardly unknown in
other contexts-particularly where the commodity involved is a form
of information. While none of the examples that follow are entirely
congruent with the provision of legal services, we think that they am-
ply illustrate and support the principle underlying the public assets
theory.
A. Communications
The Communications Act of 19342'0 and the Telecommunications
Act of 199620' both provide examples of in-kind obligations imposed
upon recipients of public-information assets. Under both statutes,
the government grants broadcasters the right to use publicly owned
frequency bands at no cost. Broadcasters then resell their access to
advertisers. In exchange for this use, broadcasters have been re-
quired to provide a variety of in-kind services. The broadest such
provision is the general requirement that licensees operate their fre-
202quencies as "public convenience, interest, or necessity" requires, as
determined by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). 0 3
The so-called "Fairness Doctrine" was perhaps the most well
known in-kind condition imposed upon broadcasters. It exacted mul-
tiple content obligations in exchange for a broadcast license: licen-
sees were required to present conflicting views of public issues and if
no person was willing to pay to air a dissenting opinion, the broad-
204caster had to present it free of charge. The Personal Attack Rule
mandated equal time (at no charge) for people who had been
"attacked" on air,05 as well as a free transcript, recording or summary
of the criticism.
2 °6
200 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
201 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West 1997).
M 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1994).
203 See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (West 1996); see also Lechtner v. Brownyard, 679 F.2d
322, 325 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that the Fairness Doctrine requires licensees to
.operate in the public interest" and to "present public questions fairly and without
bias").
204 See Cullman Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963) (stating that a licensee may
not refuse to broadcast an opposing viewpoint just because she cannot obtain paid
sponsorship for it).
205 See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,303, 10,304 (1967) (requiring the licensee to notify the per-
son attacked of her opportunity to respond on the air).
206 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 372-80 (1969) (noting that the
FCC required licensees to send a tape, transcript or summary of the critical broadcast
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The Fairness Doctrine and Personal Attack Rule were enforced by
the FCC, even to the extent of denying a license renewal as the con-
sequence of repeated violations. 207 In Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc.
v. FCC,°8 the licensee broadcast controversial programs "without pre-
senting any opposing viewpoints" and failed to establish any regular
procedure for previewing, monitoring, or reviewing its broadcast-
ers. "20) The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit af-
firmed the FCC's refusal to renew the broadcast license, stating that
the broadcaster had an "affirmative duty" to comply with the man-
dates of the FCC, even if there were attendant costs, because this was
210a reasonable condition of licensed access to the public airwaves. In
broader terms, the right to resell a public commodity was conditioned
on the provision of in-kind services.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of both the
Fairness Doctrine and the Personal Attack Rule in Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC. l Although the FCC abolished the Fairness Doctrine
in 1987,212 Red Lion continues to elucidate the acceptability of impos-
ing in-kind obligations in exchange for the exploitation of informa-
tion-assets. Indeed, Congress has continued to exact other such re-
quirements of broadcast licensees.
The Telecommunications Act of 19962'3 extracts numerous in-
kind obligations from Internet providers. For example, the Act re-
quires recipients of electronic ("Internet") rights to provide advanced
telecommunications services to schools, hospitals and other qualified
214agencies. Upon receipt of a bona fide request, a telecommunica-
to the critiqued individual).
M See Brandywine-Main Line Radio v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973) (noting that the FCC rejected a license renewal application
in part because the broadcaster failed to comply with the Fairness Doctrine and the
Personal Attack Rule on numerous occasions).
208 Id
M Id. at 29-30 (citation omitted).
210 Id. at 50 (stating that the broadcaster's preferred defense for not screening
tapes prior to broadcast-the small size of its staff-did not excuse it from compliance
with FCC regulations).
211 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969) (noting the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine
and the Personal Attack Rule given the governmental interest in ensuring a range of
programming wide enough to serve the public interest).
2 See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5052 (1987) (holding that the
Fairness Doctrine violates the First Amendment due to its "chilling effect" on "the edi-
torial processes of broadcastjournalists").
213 47 U.S.CA § 254 (West 1997).
214 See id. §§ 254(b) (6), (d).
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tions carrier must also supply services at nonmarket rates to health-
care providers in rural areas.215 Other reduced-rate provisions apply
216to schools and libraries. In the terms of the Telecommunications
Act, "these and other service obligation[s]" form part of a carrier's
"obligation to participate in the mechanisms to preserve and advance
universal service."21 7 In short, the Telecommunications Act of 1996
mirrors our public-assets theory: it grants a right to resell access to an
information-resource, carrying with it a duty to provide a designated
level of in-kind services.
B. Scientizc Research
State and federal government benefits take a variety of forms, in-
cluding access to facilities, rights of exploitation, goods, services and
218cash. The federal government provides a large amount of funding
219for research in various scientific disciplines, usually conditioning its
grants on the return of in-kind information services. The National
Science Foundation ("NSF"), for example, annually awards billions of
dollars2° to support scientific research by as many as 10,000 recipi-
ents.2 ' While the NSF is fairly open in its award policies, its grants are
consistently accompanied by in-kind information-sharing conditions.
215 Seeid. §254(h)(1)(A).
216 See id. § 254(h)(1) (B).
217 Id. § 254(h) (1) (A). Additional service obligations, which may be defined un-
der the FCC's rulemaking power, include the provision of defined services, including
the connection of network access to public schools, hospitals, health care providers
and other not-for-profit agencies. See id. § 254(h) (2) (B).
218 See Gary Feinerman, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Crossroads of Substan-
tive Rights and Equal Protection, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1991). Feinerman also
identifies tax exemptions as a category of government benefit. See id. This view is not
uncontroversial. We agree with Feinerman, however, that the allowance of an exemp-
tion to some (and not others) ought to be considered a benefit-even if the benefit
consists entirely of not being bled.
219 See Peter Brody, Confidentiality Clauses in Research Contracts and Grants: Are They
"Unconstitutional Conditions"?, 22 PUB. CONT. LJ. 447, 447 (1993) ("The federal gov-
ernment is a source of substantial funding for research in the physical and social sci-
ences.").
M In 1991, the NSF awarded approximately $2.2 billion in grants and contracts.
See National Science Foundation Grants Management: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
GovernmentalAffairs, 102d Cong. 16 (1991) [hereinafter NSFHearing] (testimony of Dr.
Frederick M. Berthol, Deputy Director, NSF) (stating that in 1991 over 95% of NSF's
$2.3 billion budget went toward grants and contracts).
22 The NSF annually receives in excess of 40,000 applications, which eventually
result in about 10,000 awards. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., NSF 95-27, GRANT
PROPosAL GUIDE at i (1995) [hereinafter NSF Grant Proposal Guide].
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Recipients are typically required to publish their findings or to permit
their research to be freely used by others.2
The NSF defines a grant as:
a type of assistance award and a legal instrument which permits an ex-
ecutive agency of the Federal government to transfer money, property,
services or other thing of value to a grantee when no substantial in-
volvement is anticipated between the agency and the recipient during
the performance of the contemplated activity.
By any definition, a grant is a public resource. For our purposes,
it is significant that NSF grants are provided without a subsequent ex-
pectation of involvement between the agency and the recipient of the
subsidy. Thus, the public asset (in this case, money) is made available
for independent, unsupervised exploitation by nongovernmental ac-
tors.
Although the relationship to lawyers' use of confidentiality rights
is strictly by analogy, some parallels are evident. NSF grants, of
course, are intended to facilitate and encourage the work of the sci-
entists who receive them, 4 just as confidentiality rights are rational-
ized as enabling lawyers to better serve their public function.m Fed-
eral grants provide direct income support to recipients, while
confidentiality protection indirectly enhances lawyers' fees.2 The
public pays for NSF grants through the expenditure of tax dollars,
and bears the costs of lawyer confidentiality in the form of increased
litigation expenses and the suppression of truth. 7  Perhaps the
greatest similarity though, lies in the fact that both public assets are
made available for the purpose of expanding the recipients' abilities
to gather and use information.
222 Recipients are required to provide periodic reports on the development of
their research, and also to submit detailed reports at the conclusion of the work for
which they receive funds. See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUND., NSF 95-26, GRANT PoLIcy
MANUAL paras. 341-43, at 111-6 (1995) [hereinafter NSF Grant Policy Manual]; NA-
TIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION FINAL PROJECT REPORT, Form 98-A. It is also expected
that an article or paper, written by the principal investigator, will "be completed in
some sort of formal document." NSFHearing, supra note 220, at 8 (testimony ofJudy
England-Joseph, Associate Director, Energy Issues, Resources, Community and Eco-
nomic Development Division, General Accounting Office).
22 NSF Grant Policy Manual, supra note 222, para. 210(c), at II-1.
24 See National Science Foundation Act of 1950, 42 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (1994)
(stating that the NSF "initiate[s] and support[s] basic scientific research" through the
use of grants, loans and other means of aid).
V-5 See supra Part II.A.1.
22 See supra text accompanying note 119.
2 See supra Part II.A.1.
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In that light, consider the NSF's "sharing policy." Under this pol-
icy, grant recipients are expected to share information with the gen-
eral public, other researchers and the scientific community.28 The
sharing obligation extends to primary data, samples, physical collec-
tions and other supporting materials that may be of interest or use to
other researchers.2 Additionally, grant recipients operate under a
"formal requirement" that they disseminate their results throughout
the scientific community through publication of "all significant find-
ings" at the conclusion of the grant period.2 0 Grantees may be de-
nied future awards, or even be suspended or terminated, for failure to
comply with terms and conditions, including the communication of
findings.23'
NSF grantees profit directly from their awards by receiving cash
stipends, while lawyers profit indirectly from access to confidentiality-
assets by reselling them to clients. We do not believe that this distinc-
tion makes a difference that has any bearing on our theory--
especially since we offer the NSF comparison only as an analogy.
Nonetheless, it may be pointed out that NSF grantees, like lawyers,
can resell the benefits of the information generated by their research,
thus profiting indirectly as well as directly. 2 The government does
not assume ownership of the research products that result from NSF-
funded projects. The grantees are permitted to retain principal
rights to the intellectual property, although this right is not intended
to reduce the investigators' responsibility for sharing and disseminat-
ing information.233 The NSF will not take any part of the income
earned from copyrightable material.m Moreover, a recipient is gen-
erally allowed the first right to a resulting patent, except in certain
22 NSF Grant Proposal Guide, supra note 221, para. H, at 22.
M R § 734(b). Exceptions to the sharing policy may be made on an individual
basis. Id.
230 NSF Grant Policy Manual, supra note 222, para. 734(a), at VII-1 1; NSF Hearing,
supra note 220, at 24 (testimony of Dr. Frederick M. Bernthal, Deputy Dir., NSF) ("We
do have a formal requirement that at the end of the grant period... there be a short
report... that the research has been carried out.").
Hearng supra note 220, at 13, 27-28 (testimony of Sen. Daniel A. Akaka & Dr.
Frederick M. Bernthal); NSF Grant Policy Manua supra note 222, § 912.1 (a) (1).
2 NSF Grant Policy Manual, supra note 222, § 753 (a) (2) (no requirement that
profits be used for continued research).
233 Id. para. 734(d), atVII-11.
2M Id. paras. 732.2(b), 753(a)(1), at VII-9, VII-12. The government does retain
authority to exercise a right to a royalty-free license on copyrighted material produced
pursuant to government-funded research. RdL This exercise of such a public right to
information, of course, further supports the public-assets theory.
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specific situations.-
Thus, the federal government goes to great lengths to encourage
the accumulation of scientific information. The right to exploit intel-
lectual property translates into a strong incentive to engage in re-
search and development. The federal government, by extending
these information-assets to grantees, enables the recipients to profit
economically from their original access to public resources-though
requiring a small in-kind recompense in the form of information
sharing. In our view, mandatory pro bono representation is the law-
yers' analog to the scientists' dissemination obligation.
C. OtherExamples
Without belaboring the point, there exist numerous other exam-
ples of in-kind exchanges for the right of access to public resources or
assets. Hospitals that receive federal funding must "furnish needed
services for persons unable to pay therefor."23 University and college
libraries that have been granted federal depository status receive gov-
ernment publications at no cost, unlike all other libraries which must
pay for the same publications. In return, the federal depositories
must agree to make the resources broadly available to the public.s?
An interesting contrast, however, is provided in the practice of
granting business concessions in national parks. Concessionaires in
national parks clearly benefit from the "resale" of their location in
spectacular, publicly owned natural settings. Under our theory, some
of the rents derived from these unique sites would be returned to the
public in the form of in-kind obligations. Under current law, how-
ever, businesses are granted concessions to operate in national parks
with few reciprocal demands. They are not required to make im-
25 See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202 (a)-(b) (1994) (noting that the situations
that might limit a contractor's retention of title include the absence of a United States
contractor, "exceptional circumstances," and possible danger to national security).
See Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291c (e) (1994). The Surgeon General is
authorized under the Act to issue regulations that facilitate access to hospitals by those
who are unable to pay for the services. See id. The current regulations require hospi-
tals to provide uncompensated care, and set a yearly standard of either 3% of a facil-
ity's operating costs or 10% of all federal assistance received by the facility. 42 C.F.R.
§ 124.503(a) (1996).
27 FEDERAL DEPOSrrORY LIBRARY PROGRAM, Federal Depository Library Manuak Guide-
lines for the Federal Depository Program § 8-1 (Supp. 11 1996). These obligations include
reference assistance to the public, the appointment of a "professionally qualified li-
brarian" to coordinate depository activities, and the employment of sufficient staff. Id.
§§ 6, 8-2.
MANDATORY PRO BONO
provements to the land, but they are granted possessory rights to the
improvements that they do make.m They also benefit from a "right to
renew"2' 9 the concessions contract, which "effectively grants conces-
sionaires 'ownership' of the operating rights in a given park in perpe-
tuity." 240 In other words, national park concessionaires are given ac-
cess to exploit public assets, but are not presently required to make
in-kind contributions in return.
A bill now pending in the House of Representatives, however,• 241
would impose in-kind obligations on national park concessionaires.
Under the proposed legislation, concessionaires would be required to
make physical improvements in exchange for the right to conduct
242their businesses in the national parks. A further provision would
require concessionaires to pay into a fund specifically earmarked for
243the upkeep and improvement of the parks in which they operate.
Finally, the "right to renew" would be eliminated, replaced with a sys-
tem of preferences dependent upon the concessionaire's matching
244the terms and conditions of the optimal competing proposal.
The debate over the concessions-reform legislation clearly reflects
dissatisfaction with a current system that is based, in part, on conces-
sionaires' seemingly unrestrained right to capitalize public assets
without returning in-kind benefits to the government. If successful,
these reform efforts will lead to a new approach that has much in
common with our proposal for mandatory pro bono representation
by attorneys.
See National Park System Concessions Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 89-249, 79 Stat.
969,970 (1965) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 20-20g (1970)).
29 See 16 U.S.C. § 20d (granting a renewal preference to concessionaires who ful-
fill their obligations satisfactorily).
240 United States Dep't of Interior, Report of the Task Force on National Park Service
Concessions 10 (Apr. 9, 1990), cited in National Park Concessions Policies and Management:
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Parks and Public Lands of the Comm. of
Interior and InsularAffairs, House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representa-
tives, 101st Cong. 12-16 (1990) (testimony of James R. Richards, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of the Interior).
i4l See National Park Scenic Overflight Concessions Act of 1995, H.R. 1954, 104th
Cong. This bill is based on H.R. 773, National Park Service Concession Policy Reform
Act of 1995, 104th Cong. (1995), and H.R. 721, Public Resources Deficit Reduction
Act of 1995, 104th Cong. § 500-17 (pertaining specifically to concessions). These two
resolutions have overlapping provisions on concessions policy.
242 SeeH.R. 773 § 12.
243 See i& §§ 8,9.
2 Id. § 7, at 8.
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IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY PRO BONO PLANS
At this point we have developed the intellectual infrastructure for
the public assets theory. We have shown that lawyers are the recipi-
ents of certain publicly created commodities which they resell to their
clients. This resale enables attorneys to charge premium fees that are
unavailable to practitioners in other law-related professions. The in-
stitution of a compulsory pro bono plan would allow the public to re-
capture some of the lawyers' rents in kind, by requiring the sharing of
lawyers' intellectual capital. We are confident that our theory rigor-
ously justifies mandatory pro bono plans in a way that previous con-
ceptions have not.
Having demonstrated the conceptual validity of pro bono plans,
however, there remains what might be called the prudential question.
Are pro bono plans a good idea? Will they effectively serve a useful
purpose? To answer this inquiry, we turn to the arguments that have
been raised against pro bono plans in the past.
A. Efficiency
Perhaps the most forceful argument against the desirability of pro
bono plans was made by Professor Jonathan Macey, who argued that
such programs, far from achieving their stated goals, would actually
harm the poor.245 In Macey's view, mandatory pro bono plans are not
merely misguided, but actually "odious and unethical."246
Macey's principal argument in this regard is that the result of in-
creased legal services would be to raise the cost to the poor of necessi-
ties such as housing. He summarizes his position as follows:
With the possible exception of matrimonial work, lawsuits against land-
lords are expected to occupy the lion's share of the time that lawyers
compelled to provide legal services for the poor would spend on manda-
tory pro bono. If more marginal lawsuits are brought against landlords
because lawyers need something to do to fulfill their mandatory pro
bono obligations, the landlords' costs of providing housing to the indi-
gent inevitably will go up. As the cost of providing housing goes up,
rents will increase and the supply of housing for the poor will go
down.
247
245 See Macey, supra note 33, at 1116-18 (discussing how mandatory pro bono plans
would drive up housing costs and thereby diminish affordable housing for poor peo-
ple).
p 46 Id at 1116.
247 Id. at 1118.
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This argument fails utterly once we unwind its many loop-back as-
sumptions. First, Macey assumes without support, that the "lion's
share" of pro bono attorney time might be spent on suits against land-
lords. In truth, this is extremely unlikely. Most existing legal services
offices spend relatively small amounts of time on landlord cases. For
example, the legal services organization for Ithaca, where Macey
works, devotes only 17% of its time to housing matters;24s at the Legal
Assistance Foundation of Chicago the figure for all evictions
(including public housing) is under 9%.249 The percentages are im-
portant, since the best available assumption is that they would be car-
ried through into pro bono efforts. Thus, a twenty hour pro bono
quota in New York might translate into three or four hours a year de-
voted to suing landlords.20 In Illinois, the figure arguably would be
two hours or less. Of course, in most locations the legal markets are
dwarfed in size by the housing markets. Consequently, if the average
lawyer ends up spending as many as six pro bono hours on housing
cases, and even if the full cost generated by that representation is
passed on to tenants,25 the net measurable impact on the housing
248 Ithaca, New York is served by Tompkins/Tioga County Legal Services. Of 1196
cases closed by that agency in 1995, 204 (17%) were classified as "housing." Of these,
it is probable that the overwhelming majority resulted in negotiated settlements, since
only 26% of the agency's overall caseload involved litigation and a mere 8% were tried
to verdict. Letter from Mark Freedman, Staff Attorney, Tompkins/Tioga County Le-
gal Services, to Steven Lubet (Aug. 26, 1996) (on file with authors).
249Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Overall Activity Summary (Jan. 1 -
Dec. 31, 1996). The figure for private evictions, which seem to be Macey's principal
concern, is only 7%. Id.
Macey's article was written in response to the Marrero Committee Report, supra
note 25, which called for every lawyer to spend 20 hours per year on pro bono repre-
sentation. See Macey, supra note 33, at 1115 (noting that the report issued by the Mar-
rero Committee pushed the issue of mandatory pro bono representation to the sur-
face). If fully 20% of those cases turn out to be landlord matters, the net result would
be four hours per year per lawyer. A figure of 17% would result in only 3.4 hours per
year.
Macey indulges the assumption that the costs associated with pro bono work
will be passed through to tenants, but it is unsupportable. See infra note 257-59 and
accompanying text. Actually, it is difficult to say just how pro bono representation
might affect landlords. Macey believes that mandatory pro bono hours will result in
increased litigation that will have to be defended by paid counsel. See Macey, supra
note 33, at 1119 (stating that pro bono attorneys will represent plaintiffs, forcing de-
fendants to hire counsel to represent them). The New York plan that Macey assailed
called for every lawyer to devote 20 hours per year to uncompensated legal work. See
supra note 250. Assuming a one-to-one equivalence, that means that the average land-
lord lawyer would have to devote less than 30 minutes a week to defending the addi-
tional cases-and that assumes that all of the pro bono hours will be spent on litiga-
tion. It is inconceivable that such a minimal expenditure could have any perceptible
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market nonetheless will be negligible to nonexistent.
Professor Macey's second assumption is that pro bono lawyers will
bring "marginal"2  lawsuits, which Macey characterizes as
"complicating evictions of nonrent-paying [sic] tenants. " m This
statement reflects ideological bias more than empirical investigation.
In fact, one survey indicates that a great majority of unrepresented
eviction defendants had potentially valid defenses-including actual
payment of rent-that they were unable to assert without counsel.2
Under these circumstances, representation should be characterized
not as marginal, but as law enforcement.55
Macey's third assumption is that costs to landlords "inevitably will
go up."5 6 We have already seen that this is untrue in any but the most
attenuated sense. Actual housing costs would almost certainly be en-
tirely unaffected by even the most ambitious pro bono plan. Macey,
however, goes even further, positing that the hypothetical increase in
housing costs will result in increased rents to the poor. In other
words, he assumes a fully elastic demand for low-income housing such
that all landlords will be able to pass all of their presumedly increased
costs through to their tenants. But poor tenants, by definition, oper-
ate on limited incomes, and thus landlords (or their lawyers) might
impact on housing prices. There is also the possibility that landlords would incur ad-
ditional expenses apart from litigation costs, although Macey does not address this.
Some such costs would no doubt come in the form of increased compliance with
building codes, which is exactly the sort of public good that Macey expects litigation to
accomplish. See Macey, supra note 33, at 1118.
-2 Macey, supra note 33, at 1118.
253 Id. (citing John A. Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objectiv4 65
A.BAJ. 564, 566 (1979)).
Marrero Committee Report, supra note 25, at 773 (noting that, in all the reported
cases where pro bono representation was provided, no evictions were reported); see
also Millemann, supra note 29, at 26 (concluding that many inner-city defendants in
summary eviction proceedings have meritorious defenses).
25 Macey expands on his "marginal case" theory by arguing that paying clients will
only bring cases where the expected benefit outweighs their cost, but that pro bono
clients, freed from this constraint, will pursue meritless cases. As he puts it, "[i]n the
case of pro bono lawyering, however, the cost of mounting litigation is reduced to
zero." Macey, supra note 33, at 1118. This analysis ignores the lawyers' costs. There is
no reason to think, and certainly Macey provides none, that pro bono lawyers will rou-
tinely choose to bring meaningless cases. Required to devote, say, 20 hours a year to
uncompensated representation, why would lawyers not opt to bring the cases that of-.
fer the greatest nonmonetary rewards? Free to choose among nonpaying clients, why





well have to eat whatever slight costs might be associated with pro
bono representation.
Professor Macey makes two further efficiency arguments. First, he
contends that pro bono plans are unnecessary, because poor people
already are receiving the optimum level of legal services.m He also
claims that mandatory pro bono programs would result in unfair
wealth transfers from solo practitioners to big firms.2 9 He is wrong in
both regards. Macey explains that poor people do not receive legal
services because they choose to spend their limited resources on
more pressing needs, such as food and shelter.2 From this he con-
cludes that pro bono plans are "wasteful and inefficient," since any
rational poor person would obviously prefer a direct cash transfer of
even $2500 to twenty hours of services from a Wall Street partner,
which Macey values at around $10,000.26 This argument proves too
much. Individual indigents would no doubt prefer cash transfers to
all manner of in-kind services, ranging from garbage collection to po-
lice protection to park maintenance. But just as in the case of police
protection, the sum social benefits of broadened legal services may be• • 262
greater than the distinct value to individual recipients. Macey him-
25 See id. at 1116-17 (stating that the reason why poor people do not seek legal
services is because they are "rational" and would rather spend their money elsewhere).
29 See it& at 1119-20 (finding that mandatory pro bono would cause defendants to
have to hire counsel, usually at large firms, thereby giving them added wealth).
M See id. at 1116.
261 See i&L at 1117. There is a further flaw here. Macey sets the retail value of a
partner's time at $500 per hour, although this is extravagant for all but a very few at-
torneys. See Weidlich, supra note 26, at A5 (stating that according to an international
survey, attorneys in the U.S. bill between $200 and $400 per hour, with $400 per hour
listed as a "top hourly rate"). In any event, whatever rate might be billed to clients, the
net incremental cost of pro bono time to the law firm is probably closer to zero. That
is, virtually no law firms turn away paying clients, particularly at $500 per hour. In-
stead, they either work harder, longer, more efficiently or they increase capacity.
Thus, the expenditure of 20 hours on pro bono representation would not result in lost
billings. Indeed, the pro bono client could receive more benefit from the lawyer's
time than the lawyer would lose in income. Voili, efficiency.
It is particularly ironic that Macey made this argument while simultaneously posit-
ing "that the big push for mandatory pro bono is coming from big firm lawyers at a
time when demand for the services of those firms is lagging appreciably behind the
available supply." Macey, supra note 33, at 1119. Though Macey failed to acknowledge
it, the utilization of a firm's existing excess capacity would cost the firm little or noth-
ing. Hence, even on Macey's terms it is fallacious to conjecture that pro bono time
has a cost of $500 per hour.
262 Additionally, as we demonstrated earlier, there is a strong case for requiring
lawyers to donate in-kind services as compensation for their access to publicly created
information assets. The case for direct cash transfers, however, would be weak. Thus,
the choice for the poor is not between lawyers and cash, but between lawyers and
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self recognizes this with regard to paying clients when he observes
that "[1] itigation often produces benefits... for society as a whole be-
cause individuals who expect to pay damages for the harm they cause
have an incentive to reduce their harmful activities.
"
263
But Macey's "optimum services" argument is wrong in an even
more fundamental way. He believes that poor people spend little
money on lawyers because they place a low value on legal services. It
is equally plausible, however, that they value legal services at a reason-
able level, but still cannot afford them due to competition from busi-
nesses and well-to-do individuals. That is, given a finite number of at-
torneys, poor people must compete for their time with corporations
and wealthy people who are in a position to bid up the price. Since,
as we have seen, part of the price of lawyers is attributable to publicly
created assets, it is not unreasonable to make some small amount of
264the resulting services available at nonauction prices.
Finally, Professor Macey suggests that pro bono plans are part of a
seemingly sinister effort 65 to transfer income from small firm practi-
nothing.
263 Macey, supra note 33, at 1118.
264 Our social structure does not expect poor people to compete at auction for
sanitation, minimal medical services, education or other necessities. We realize that
the characterization of legal services as a necessity is controversial in some quarters.
Professor Macey, for example, believes that, because poor people have slight or nega-
tive net worth, it would be irrational for them to engage lawyers to represent them in
divorce proceedings. See id. at 1117-18 ("When there is simply no material estate to
fight over, it does not make sense to hire lawyers as combatants."). True enough, one
does not need an attorney to do combat over a nonexistent estate. But how, pray tell,
will the indigent become divorced without lawyers? Self-representation ranges from
risky to impossible, especially where there are issues of child custody, support and visi-
tation.
We are confident, therefore, that no one would argue that legal representation is
always nonessential. Thus, the question becomes one of case selection. We are com-
fortable with the proposition that pro bono services ought to be devoted to primary
legal needs.
265 Macey intimates something approaching a conspiracy: "It is no coincidence,"
he cautions, "that the big push for mandatory pro bono is coming from big firm law-
yers at a time when demand for the services of those firms is lagging appreciably be-
hind the available supply." IR. at 1119. So, supposedly, big law firms are foisting pro
bono plans on the entire bar just so that they can make work for their idle associates.
This is a scenario worthy of Oliver Stone. The reality is far different. Large law firms
have a much easier and cheaper way of dealing with excess capacity. They can fire or
lay off unnecessary associates, which is exactly what they did during the legal recession
of the early 1990s. See Edward A. Adams, Firms Weather the Recessionary Storm: For Some It
Was a Tempest in a Teapot, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 7, 1994, at S3 (recounting associate layoffs);
Edward A. Adams, Milbank Lays Off 29 Senior Associates, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 17, 1992, at 2;
Edward A. Adams, Skadden Arps Pink Slips 45 Associates, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 2;
Susan Freinkel, Chapman & Cutler Cuts 17, AM. LAW., May, 1995, at 14.
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tioners to the upper-strata elite, who will be the "real beneficiaries of
mandatory pro bono programs.2 " This transfer will occur, says
Macey, because the increased efficiencies of big firm practice will al-
low elite lawyers to cope more easily with the demands of any pro
bono plan. Big firms can shift personnel, but solo practitioners can-
not; big firms can amortize their costs more easily than small firms;
"buyout" provisions favor larger offices.2"7 All of this is true.26s As an
economist, though, Macey should understand that the very purpose
of lawyers combining into a large firm is to create competitive and
other advantages. So it should be no surprise that big firms will have
an advantage when it comes to adjusting to pro bono plans. But
Macey never explains why this should be considered unfair, much less
an income transfer. Large firms also have an advantage when it
comes to amortizing the cost of computers or assigning secretarial
work, but no one sees a wealth transfer operating when courts require
that pleadings be typewritten or printed. In any event, large firms
269and small firms almost never compete for the same business, so
even proven disadvantages to small firms would not actually transfer
wealth to Wall Street.
Macey also thinks that mandatory pro bono plans will increase the
demand for big firm lawyers, by requiring their clients to defend
more lawsuits. 70 Here he has it completely backwards. If anything, a
pro bono plan will create work for smaller firms. Large law firms do
not typically engage in run-of-the-mill tenant disputes, but solo practi-
tioners do. To the extent that a pro bono plan actually encouraged
elite lawyers to represent tenants in evictions, the lawyer-beneficiaries
As to the suspicious "coincidence," Macey himself notes (twice) that debates over
pro bono obligations "have been around for about as long as the world has been in-
habited by lawyers and poor people." Macey, supra note 33, at 1115. For example, in
1981, at a time when there was no apparent lag in the demand for big firm legal serv-
ices, the ABA's Kutak Commission proposed a mandatory pro bono requirement of 40
hours per year per lawyer. See Schneyer, supra note 14, at 113-14. How would Macey
explain that "coincidence"?
266 Macey, supra note 33, at 1119.
267 See id. at 1120 (listing ways in which a mandatory pro bono program will in-
crease demand for lawyers in large firms).
M See Silverman, supra note 82, at 1001-11 (describing possible adverse effects of
pro bono plans on smaller law firms and concluding that the effects are impossible to
predict).
269 See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 130-31 (1982) (concluding, based on studies of the Chicago
bar, that large firms primarily serve the corporate client sector and smaller law prac-
tices serve mostly individual clients).
27 See Macey, supra note 33, at 1119.
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would be the small firm practitioners who would no doubt delight in
the increased demand for their (paid) services.
B. Competence
Opponents of pro bono plans often object that the legal work re-
quired will be too specialized or complicated for lawyers who have not
specialized in poverty law or related fields. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, for example, stated that a mandatory pro bono plan would
be a "recipe for malpractice," since the lawyers involved would be un-
familiar and unwilling participants.27' With full respect to Justice
O'Connor, we think that she underestimates lawyers and overstates
her case.
First, it is simply wrong to think that special, esoteric legal skills
are necessary to provide legal services to persons of limited means.
Certainly, no novice should be asked to defend a capital felony27 or
prosecute a welfare-rights class action,2rs but the overwhelming major-
ity of poor people have legal problems that are far more mundane.
Wills, uncontested divorces, real estate closings, administrative hear-
ings-this is the common fare of most poverty lawyers. These mat-
ters, and others like them, are hardly so complex that a reasonably
competent attorney could not acquire the necessary proficiency in a
very short time. 4 Manifestly, "there is some kind of public service
function which every lawyer can competently perform."2 5
Indeed, Justice O'Connor herself went on to argue that the un-
271 See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 3 ("1 worry that the problem of quality control
will plague any program of mandatory pro bono work.").
r See Christopher Hanson, Death Row Will Speed Up, But Injustices May Too, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 19, 1995, at 14A (describing inexperienced and incompetent
lawyers handling capital cases); Richard Lacayo, You Don't Always Get Perry Mason: As
Coleman Goes to the Chair, Questions Remain About His Case and the Quality of Legal Defend-
ers, TIME,June 1, 1992, at 38 (same); Stephanie Saul, When Death Is the Penalty: Attorneys
for PoorDefendants Often Lack Experience and Skill, NEWSDAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8 (noting
that federal legislation requires states to appoint lawyers with at least five years of
criminal defense experience to represent indigent death penalty defendants).
273 Regarding the difficulty of locating competent attorneys to represent plaintiffs
in poverty-related class-action litigation, see Nina Bernstein, Suit Challenges Accord that
Bars Legal Services Class-Action Cases forPoor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1996, at D22.
274 See Marrero Committee Report, supra note 25, at 811 (refuting the misconception
that all indigent representation requires courtroom practice).
27 Steven B. Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspec-
tives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255, 266 (1981). Justice O'Connor seems also to recognize
this. See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 5 (listing many areas of law in which pro bono
services are needed).
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met need for pro bono services could be fulfilled by law students
practicing in law school clinics.2 6 We are strong supporters of clinical
legal education, but we still recognize that most lawyers are more
adept than most students. Justice O'Connor's position is therefore
self-defeating. If law students, in a single semester, can acquire the
skills necessary to provide indigent representation, then surely prac-
ticing attorneys are capable of the same education. And since pro
bono requirements would be a career-long obligation, lawyers would
have many years over which to amortize the time invested in obtain-
ing poverty law capability.
If lawyers practicing today are not competent to assist poor peo-
ple, it is only because it has not been expected of them. Once pro
bono obligations become mandatory, the necessary skills would even-
tually become simply part of being a lawyer. Every state requires law-
yers to pass a bar exam, demonstrating at least minimal command of
areas where they may well never practice. Aspiring lawyers study for
the bar, and most succeed in passing it, notwithstanding their fre-
quent disinterest in, if not out-and-out antipathy for, some or all of
the necessary subjects. We see no reason to assume that the over-
whelming majority of successful test-takers would do other than apply
those same proven educational skills to the mastery of indigent repre-
sentation.
It can hardly be denied that thousands, perhaps tens of thou-
sands, of lawyers toil daily at tasks they do not particularly enjoy. New
associates at large law firms are unceremoniously shuttled off to the
library or documents room, to spend their days (and many of their
nights) in unfulfilling scut work.2 7 As drudgery-filled as the assign-
ments might be, the great majority of new associates perform ade-
quately, some even feigning enthusiasm. Of course, the potential re-
wards are great: prestige, income, partnership. But under a
mandatory pro bono plan the rewards would also be great. If not suf-
ficiently motivated by the desire to serve indigents, lawyers at all levels
should find ample incentive in the need to maintain their licenses.
276 See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 4.
277 SeeYOUNG LAwYERS Div., AM. BAR ASS'N, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
1990, at 52-55 (1991) (concluding that "[d]issatisfaction has become a major problem
throughout the profession" and that the number of lawyers who are dissatisfied with
theirjobs has increased significantly since 1984); cf. Thomas D. Morgan & Robert W.
Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Pluralist Society, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 984, 989 n.29
(1995) (asserting that lawyers can and will ably perform even unpleasant duties).
278 See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 113, at 89-90.
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But lest we be accused of cynicism, let us hasten to add that we
fully expect virtually all lawyers to be vigorous, zealous and deter-
mined to provide high quality representation to their pro bono cli-
ents. Professional ethics require that attorneys act competently; no
distinction is made between paying and nonpaying clients.2 We take
ethics seriously, and we think that the overwhelming majority of law-
yers do as well. We trust that attorneys who might deliberately render
"half-hearted, shoddy, ineffective service" on pro bono matters are
few and far between.280
C. Constitutionality
There is ample legal and scholarly support for the proposition
that mandatory pro bono plans would not violate the Constitution. 8'
Consequently, we will not rehearse those arguments here.
We do note, however, that even the strongest versions of tradi-
tional constitutional arguments would be inapplicable to a plan sup-
ported by the public-assets theory. Under our analysis, pro bono
plans would be initiated precisely to recapture some of the value
gained by lawyers through their exploitation of public resources.
Thus, such plans are indisputably organized for the purpose of
"'improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of
the State.' 28 2 Moreover, public-assets pro bono programs clearly have
the constitutionally permissible effect of requiring "all of the lawyers
who derive benefit from the unique status of being among those ad-
mitted to practice before the courts [to] be called upon to pay a fair




279 See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1995) ("A lawyer shall
provide competent representation to a client."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1980) (prohibiting a lawyer from "[h]andling a legal matter
which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle").
280 Marero Committee Report, supra note 25, at 109.
281 See, e.g., id. at 114 (stating that "the weight of scholarly and judicial opinion
adequately responds to the constitutional challenges"); Rosenfeld, supra note 275, at
286-96 (surveying and rejecting constitutional objections); Silverman, supra note 82, at
948-55 (rejecting most constitutional challenges, but suggesting that a First Amend-
ment objection might have some merit). But see David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the
Lawyer's Duty to Serv 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980) (arguing that some of the constitu-
tional objections are valid).
282 Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 843 (1961) (plurality opinion)).
283 Id. at 12.
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V. TAX OR DRAFT?
A final question concerning mandatory pro bono obligations is
whether they should take the form of a tax or a draft. Should lawyers
be required personally to engage in uncompensated representation,
or should there be buy-out provisions? The answer to this question is
not essential to our thesis; the public-assets theory supports either
model. Our conclusion, however, is that the personal service model is
preferable.
Proponents of buy-out plans point to one overriding benefit:
economy. As Professor Mary Coombs put it:
[T]he poor will benefit more under a plan with a buy-out option
than under a straight time obligation, because they will receive either
work performed by those who choose to do such work or an equal or
larger quantity of services from public interest lawyers funded through
monetary contributions. The funds generated by attorneys exercising
the monetary option can support other lawyers-providing more legal
services-in moderately paid full-time legal services work. Assume, for
example, that it costs $50,000 a year to support a beginning legal serv-
ices lawyer... who can provide 2,000 hours in legal work for the poor.
The monetary contributions of 12.5 lawyers earning $200 per hour
would support that lawyer, though they would have directly provided.... 284
only 250 hours of such services.
In a novel twist on buy-out plans, Professors Galanter and Palay
proposed that law firms be allowed to "buy and sell" credits for pro




Inherent in either conception is the vision of idealistic young law-
yers cheerfully undertaking the pro bono obligations of their more
mercenary elders. Galanter and Palay call them "DoGooder Associ-
"286ates. In this scenario, everyone wins. Aspiring legal services law-
yers receive financial support, disinterested corporate types reserve
their time for paying clients, and the poor receive as many (and
284 Coombs, supra note 81, at 220. Timothy Terrell and James Wildman reject the
concept of lawyers' personal pro bono responsibility, but not on the basis of econom-
ics. They assert that it is the duty of the bar to facilitate pro bono representation, but
that no individual should be required to participate (or, presumably, contribute cash)
directly. See Terrell & Wildman, supra note 4, at 428-31. We refuted this position, see
supra Part I, when we established the general public assets theory. Terrell and Wild-
man do not address in detail the "tax or draft" issue.
M Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Let Firms Buy and Sell CreditforPro Bono, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 17.
28Id"
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probably more) hours of representation. But we see two problems.
First, it cannot be guaranteed that only committed "do-gooders" will
end up shouldering the massive pro bono burden. Second, there is
an irreplaceable social value in requiring all lawyers to deal with the
problems of the disadvantaged.
Both Coombs's article and Galanter and Palay's essay assume that
buy-out funds will be used to support the equivalent of today's legal
services offices, staffed by dedicated young lawyers who have ,chosen
indigent representation as a career path. The Galanter and Palay
plan explicitly envisions that pro bono providers ("PBPs") will bid for
contracts to fulfill other lawyers' obligations. They believe that the
PBPs will be composed of "dedicated people with specialized compe-
tence in matters that concern the poor."
28 7
The introduction of a market, however, suggests a different real-
ity. Let's refer to our establishment, pro bono-avoiding law firm as
Rainmaker & Fee ("R&F"). Having chosen to substitute money for
time, R&F will obviously tend to contract with the lowest bidders. If
"DoGooder Associates" might be willing to fulfill a firm's hourly obli-
gations for a payment of $150,000, why wouldn't R&F try to find an
alternative provider who would undertake the same tasks for less,
preferably much less. The result would inevitably be a squeeze, as le-
gal services entrepreneurs enter the market and drive down the price.
Of course, the surest way to make a profit would be to hire underpaid
lawyers, to invest little in training, and to count on high turnover to
keep seniority (and salaries) low. Clients would be shortchanged, but
poor people receiving free services would hardly be in a position to
mount an effective protest.
There is a further difficulty with Galanter and Palay's proposal.
They believe that payment to PBPs will result in "more lawyering for
the same amount of money,"m since their costs will be far lower than
those of conventional law firms. As we will demonstrate presently,
that is quite unlikely to be the case. Assume, as Galanter and Palay
do, that R&F is composed of thirty attorneys, and has an aggregate
pro bono obligation of 1500 hours of service. Now assume that Do-
Gooder Associates offers to fulfill that obligation in exchange for a
cash payment of $150,000. In Galanter and Palay's model, the Do-
Gooder operation could use that money to support two or three full-




But why would DoGooder Associates choose to provide the additional
work for no compensation? Wouldn't they attempt to sell their 2500
hours of excess capacity to another law firm, say, Stahl & DeLay, to
fulfill the obligations of its fifty lawyers?
Galanter and Palay presume that a PBP's efficiencies would be
used to generate extra service, but a more palpable incentive would
be to generate additional income. And, of course, there is no guaran-
tee that DoGooder would win the reverse auction. Perhaps
Don'tCare Associates would undercut their price by offering to do the
same work for $100,000, in which case the successful bidder would
have an even greater incentive to seek out more work from additional
firms. Thus, the effect would not be increased services, but rather
hour-for-hour substitution of low-price lawyering for high-price law-
yering. Law firms, no doubt, would cheer this outcome, but none of
the benefit would inure to the poor.
The problem with a market is that it will tend to behave like a
market, which makes it a particularly unsuitable device for the deliv-
ery of free legal work. The law firms' sole incentive would be to divest
themselves of their pro bono duties at the lowest possible expense.
The eventual providers' incentive would be to drive down the mar-
ginal cost of providing services. Clients, we can all agree, have a stake
in quality, but as nonpaying recipients, they would be powerless to en-
force their interests, lacking even the ability to take their business to a
competitor. Thus, the PBP system would give us all of the worst fea-
tures of a market, with none of its compensating controls.
If this scenario seems unduly glum, may we suggest that a survey
of other service providers in poor neighborhoods would be instruc-
tive. It is a well-known phenomenon that furniture stores and used
car lots catering to the poor are typically characterized by shoddy
merchandise, indifferent service and high prices. Idealism, of course,
can overcome this problem, but efficient markets tend to drive out
idealists in favor of economizers. That is why medical services in too
many neighborhoods are now provided exclusively by low-margin,
high-volume, absentee-owned Medicaid mills.2
9
289 See, e.g., Lynette Holloway, Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
1995, at Al (reporting that a physician has been convicted of murder in the death of a
patient at a clinic that "'cut comers for monetary gain at the expense of the lives of its
patients, who ofttimes were poor and uneducated'" (quoting Richard A. Brown,
Queens District Attorney)); Illinois'Next Big Medicaid Scandal CHI. TIuB., May 26, 1996,
§ 1, at 20 (noting that "bad things can happen when for-profit HMOs... hustle new
members among the poor and undereducated"); Dan Thomasson, Medicare Ripoffs Beg
for Reform, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 3, 1995, at 47A (detailing abuses in indigent
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In any event, we believe that a unique advantage is lost once law-
yers are given the option of substituting cash for personal services.
To state it succinctly, it is too easy for injustice to flourish in courts
where the only "customers" are poor people. The presence in those
courts of lawyers from all walks of life, even if compelled, would give
elite members of the bar an interest and a stake in the operation of
those courts. One of us previously published a memoir illustrating
this principle, which we now recount in full:
For two years after I graduated from law school, I worked in a legal
services office on Chicago's west side. From my first day on the job I be-
came our office's "consumer law expert," which required me to spend
considerable time in the courtrooms on the eleventh floor of the civic
center. While the words "eleventh floor" are unlikely to evoke a phobic
reaction from lawyers outside of Chicago, anyone who ever practiced
there will recognize immediately the terrible scene that I am about to
describe.
In the early 1970s the eleventh floor was a no-man's land for poor
people. It housed the landlord-tenant and collection courts, and there-
fore saw an endless stream of hapless individuals come before the bench
to be processed. The all but inevitable outcome of every case was either
an eviction or a wage garnishment. The plaintiffs' bar ran the court-
rooms, to the point that these lawyers virtually organized the judges'
calendars. The defendants were almost always unrepresented. If they
had defenses, they had no way of recognizing or raising them. The best
result that a defendant could hope for, whether liable or not, was usu-
ally a few extra days in his or her apartment or a few extra months to pay
a debt.
The worst feature of the eleventh floor, however, was not the judg-
ments that were entered. The worst feature of the eleventh floor was
the way that the defendants were treated. The judges were nasty and
peremptory. They rushed through the cases without allowing the de-
fendants to talk, and they ridiculed defendants who attempted to say a
few words in their own behalves. The clerks and bailiffs were worse, re-
fusing to answer questions or to give explanations. The only advice they
would give was "sit down and wait until your case is called." A defendant
who stepped out to the washroom ran the risk of a default judgment, al-
though cases could be "held" for hours if the plaintiff's attorney was
busy elsewhere.
Every courtroom on the eleventh floor seemed to operate in contin-
ual bedlam. The plaintiffs' attorneys were always huddled and talking to
each other. The clerks were always shouting orders to the ill-fated de-
fendants. The judges were always barking out their judgments-seven
days to move, thirty days to pay, add on the attorney's fees, and do not
medical delivery, including "Medicaid mills, laboratory scams.., and prescription
fraud").
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ask any questions. To me, the noise represented the character of the
entire place; I thought of it as the din of injustice.
Legal services lawyers were seen as interlopers, people who wanted to
ruin everyone else's easy time. We were tolerated, but just barely. I
think that the judges considered us to occupy a position about half a
step higher than the indigent defendants. These were courtrooms badly
in need of reform.
Then one day, when I was sitting in one of the worst courtrooms
waiting for my daily portion of judicial abuse, it happened. A pin-
striped, downtown lawyer walked up to the bench and said, 'Your
Honor, I would like to present Mr. Albert Jenner." In 1975, the late Al-
bertJenner was probably the most well known and widely respected law-
yer in Chicago. A name partner in Jenner & Block, he was most famous
as the Republican counsel to the Senate Watergate Committee. Many
believed that Mr. Jenner was the man most responsible for the eventual
committee vote to impeach President Nixon. His visage-stern counte-
nance, ramrod posture, piercing eyes, and signature bow tie-was well
known to every Chicagoan who owned a television set. Albert Jenner
was a man of unrivaled prominence, integrity, and power, and he had
apparently come to the eleventh floor as a favor to a friend or employee.
Once Mr. Jenner's presence was announced, the entire courtroom
suddenly metamorphosed. The muttering plaintiffs' bar fell silent.
Clerks began answering inquiries from unrepresented defendants. The
judge actually asked questions about the facts and the law. It was as
though we were now in a real courtroom where justice, and people,
mattered. Furthermore, this effect lasted for the entire day, long after
Mr. Jenner left.
More than anything else imaginable, the unexpected presence of an
important lawyer recast procedures on the eleventh floor. The judges
and court personnel began to worry about how they appeared. Instead
of facing only disinterested regulars and perceived no-accounts, they
now had to be concerned about the well-to-do and powerful. For the
rest of that day it was possible to practice law on the eleventh floor as
though we were in a real courtroom.
By the next week, unfortunately, the residual effects of Mr. Jenner's
visit had worn off. The clerks and judges were back to their old,
short-tempered selves. Occasionally, however, even they seemed to long
for the dignity and status that comes with procedural regularity; they
bragged, as though it reflected honor upon them, of the time that "Bert
Jenner handled a case in our courtroom."M
The lesson here is equally applicable to Professor Coombs's tradi-
tional proposal and to Professors Galanter and Palay's market-based
approach.
Steven Lubet, Professionalism Revisited, 42 EMORY L.J. 197, 204-06 (1993)
(footnote omitted). Another version of this story appeared under the unfortunate
title Prominence Counts in Pro Bono Appearances, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 4, 1993, at 15.
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The presence of a prominent lawyer can have a transformative ef-
fect on a courtroom. And there are many courtrooms that are in se-
rious need of transformation. While the eleventh floor of the 1970s
might have been unique in its combination of clerical squall and ju-
ridic torpor, there are numerous others today that differ only as a
matter of degree. Eviction courts, collection courts, traffic courts, ju-
venile courts and misdemeanor courts everywhere would all no doubt
benefit from a healthy dose of public exposure.
Imagine the effect, then, if on any given day some contemporary
equivalent of Albert Jenner were likely to walk into any given court-
room. Best behavior would become a constant, rather than an aber-
rant, occurrence. The norms of process would change for the better.
There could be no more dirty little secrets or comfortable procedural
shortcuts, since missteps would now run the risk of offending some-
one capable of requital. 2 We do not see the presence of important
lawyers as a panacea, but their involvement with poor people would
be a worthwhile first step.'2
The public-assets theory establishes a social claim on lawyers' re-
sources, by virtue of their utilization of publicly created goods. The
most robust version of this claim would require direct, in-kind services
by members of the bar. This approach is merited first because it re-
quires the return to the public of precisely the same form of capital as
lawyers exploit on behalf of their paying clients, and second because
it multiplies the benefits to the social order in a form that could not
be accomplished otherwise.
CONCLUSION
We have presented here our initial effort at developing a com-
prehensive statement of lawyers' pro bono obligations. Unlike previ-
ous accounts, our theory does not depend upon appeals to need or
moral duty, nor is it premised upon the asserted existence of a factu-
ally questionable monopoly.
We understand that our theory is novel, and therefore not com-
29 Lubet, supra note 290, at 207.
2W Galanter and Palay reject this argument, referring to it as reflecting "a childlike
faith that we will be saved by Big Daddy." Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, We Don't
Need Superstars to Do Pro Bono, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 14. We think that our point
is more sophisticated. Institutions respond to power. For better or worse, prominent
lawyers hold power in a way that is not soon likely to be duplicated by pro bono pro-
viders, whether motivated by idealism or mercantilism. Hence, the required presence
of big shots may lead to systemic reform.
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pletely developed. For example, we have not been able to locate the
appropriate number of pro bono hours, other than to posit that it
probably lies between 20 and 50 hours per year.23 We are also not
fully satisfied with our discussion of other uses of public assets in dif-
ferent contexts; we believe that our examples are informative, but we
acknowledge that they are not entirely comparable to law practice.
We are confident, however, in our central insight that secrecy (or
perhaps the assurance of secrecy) is a commodity-established by
public means, but exploited enthusiastically by lawyers and their cli-
ents. Hence, our observation that attorneys as a class benefit finan-
cially from their access to and sale of public assets. The exaction of a
defined number of pro bono hours, therefore, is an appropriate in-
kind commission taken in consideration of lawyers' profitable utiliza-
tion of publicly created resources.
293 In other words, between 0.75% and 2% of the typical lawyer's annual billings.
See supra note 26. In fact, since lawyers necessarily work more hours than they bill, the
actual impact on their working time would be even less.
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